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Strategic Litigation and Antitrust
Petitioning Immunity
Nicholas E. Hakun*
The First Amendment allows a business to sue its competitors even if its goal is to
destroy them. It should not, however, protect a lawsuit designed primarily to inflict harm
collateral to the proceedings. Unfortunately, courts routinely fail to distinguish legitimate suits
from predatory shams and have no solution for the litigant whose claims simultaneously achieve
both goals.
Sophisticated businesses are weaponizing litigation to inflict harm on their competitors
and being rewarded with antitrust petitioning immunity thanks to the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. After decades of divergence between the courts and economists, the doctrine’s sham
exception has been outsmarted. Economic analysis proves that the sham exception is woefully
underinclusive and that more complex predatory suits are being inappropriately immunized.
The Third Circuit’s recent AbbVie decision highlights how the existing sham standard
sometimes forces courts into anticompetitive outcomes. My proposal is an aggressive,
economically robust solution to properly and fairly prosecute predatory litigation.

* Adjunct Assistant Professor, Temple University Fox School of Business and Management.
( B.B.A., Temple University, J.D., Georgetown University Law Center). Judicial Law Clerk, Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. This article would not have been possible without the assistance of Alan
Devlin and Professor Jeffrey R. Boles. All opinions, and mistakes, are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust laws exist to prevent abuse of the competitive process.1 The problem
is that anticompetitive abuse and procompetitive activity are often difficult to
differentiate.2 This problem drove the creation of antitrust petitioning immunity,
commonly referred to as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, to protect those whose
actions straddle the line between appropriate and anticompetitively abusive.3
1. Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 564 ( 2012 )
( highlighting the aims of U.S. antitrust laws, among others “( 1 ) private economic power, like all
absolute power, is subject to abuse and injurious to public welfare; ( 2 ) such power must be
decentralized to protect a free society from its abuse; ( 3 ) competitively structured markets diffuse
private power and discipline economic decision making; and ( 4 ) antitrust policy is critical to preserving
competitive markets” ( citing Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and the Arabesques
of Economic Theory, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 161–79 ( 1995 ) ).
2. See Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 285–86,
305 ( 2010 ) ( explaining how “irrational threats” and other seemingly non-profit maximizing strategies
can be “both credible and profitable” ).
3. See, e.g., James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First Amendment, and the
Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 99 ( 1985 ) (“[ A] firm that seeks to change the law ( or to protect
its interests while legislative or judicial efforts are in progress ) may need to file petitions, suits, or
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The Noerr-Pennington doctrine exists because the First Amendment protects
the right to petition the government for redress.4 The tension created by our
antitrust laws and the First Amendment has resulted in the principle that, if
legitimate petitioning results in anticompetitive harm, courts should defer to
protecting free speech over the competitive process.5 To enact this principle, courts
grant the petitioner immunity from antitrust liability. This immunity applies
wherever government petitioning occurs, including the courts.6
Courts apply the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in the litigation context to prevent
competitors from turning the legal system into an anticompetitive weapon.7
Litigants who seek to abuse the judicial process do so through predatory litigation.8
The hallmark of predatory litigation is that the litigant’s true motive is not the case’s
legal success but its anticompetitive impact.9 Identifying true motivation, however,
has proven challenging for scholars and courts.10
Over the past fifty years, courts have struggled with identifying and
prosecuting predatory litigation without infringing on the right to petition. The
governing test for identifying predatory litigation is the “sham” exception, defined
by the Supreme Court in its 1993 case Professional Real Estate Investors,

appeals against many potential respondents, particularly when there are many rivals in whose favor the
challenged policy otherwise would work. Such conduct, however, might appear to be a meritless effort
to barricade a market, if judged ex ante and from an ‘objective’ standpoint. Subjecting that firm to
antitrust scrutiny might force the initiator of these actions to choose between facing chilling litigation
or sacrificing potentially valid and valuable causes of action.” ).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” ).
5. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 814 F.2d 358, 376 ( 7th
Cir. 1987 ) ( “The antitrust laws allow people to ask the government for a monopoly, and they allow
them to keep what they get.” ).
6. See Hurwitz, supra note 3, at 66 ( “As a general rule, the Noerr doctrine gives primacy to first
amendment considerations. In most circumstances, it provides immunity from antitrust challenge for
efforts to influence legislative, executive, administrative, and adjudicatory conduct by government.” ).
7. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 ( 1991 ).
8. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 347 ( 1978 )
( “Predation by abuse of governmental procedures, including administrative and judicial processes,
presents an increasingly dangerous threat to competition.” ).
9. See, e.g., Hurwitz, supra note 3, at 70 ( “The conceptual theme underlying predatory use of
governmental processes is that, for strategic purposes, governmental decisions are a manipulable factor
in market performance. Just as a firm may seek to exacerbate raw material shortages or labor unrest
that threaten to injure its competitors more than itself, so too may a firm seek to manipulate
governmental decisions to the disadvantage of its rivals. In particular, firms may seek to raise their
rivals’ costs disproportionately, restrict entry, or facilitate collusive behavior.” ); see also CHRISTOPHER
C. KLEIN, THE ECONOMICS OF SHAM LITIGATION: THEORY, CASES, AND POLICY, 24 ( 1989 ),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/economics-sham-litigation-theory-cases
-and-policy/232158_0.pdf [ https://perma.cc/5Z5P-D5YC].
10. See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Developments in the Noerr Doctrine, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 361,
363 ( 1987 ) ( “A sham purpose is also difficult to prove in respect of administrative or judicial
litigation—but no longer impossible to prove.” ).
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Inc. v. Columbia Pictures (PRE).11 A sham lawsuit must be objectively baseless,
meaning filed without probable cause, and be subjectively motivated to harm
competition.12 Since PRE, the Supreme Court has been silent.
The PRE test has resulted in numerous anticompetitive outcomes, confusion
in the lower courts, and strong criticism. Antitrust scholars have proposed
alternative standards rooted in logic and economic theories.13 Commentators have
decried PRE’s test as overly restrictive.14 Despite these pleas for reform, lower
courts remain stuck with an unworkable “sham” standard.
One area where predatory litigation has been particularly rampant is the
pharmaceutical industry. Scholars have long known that the existing intellectual
property scheme surrounding pharmaceuticals has made the industry ripe for
antitrust violations.15 The intense competition between generic and brand products
can drive competitors to aggressive tactics.16 Thanks to government regulation,
patent-holding monopolists have the power to impose delays on generic competitors.17

11. Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 51 ( 1993 )
[ hereinafter PRE ].
12. See, e.g., In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig. Indirect Purchaser Class, 868 F.3d 132, 148–49
( 3d Cir. 2017 ) ( “This two-tiered process requires the plaintiff to disprove the challenged lawsuit’s legal
viability before the court will entertain evidence of the suit’s economic viability.” (quoting PRE, 508
U.S. at 60–61 ) ).
13. See, e.g., Christopher C. Klein, Strategic Sham Litigation: Economic Incentives in the Context
of the Case Law, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 241 ( 1986 ); Hurwitz, supra note 3, at 122–25.
14. Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55 RUTGERS
L. REV. 965, 1025 ( 2003 ) ( “A case can have some minimal merit—sufficient to avoid the label ‘lack of
probable cause’—and yet a reasonable litigant could not realistically expect success. To the extent that
the majority opinion seems to adopt the probable cause standard for its objective baselessness test, it
overly restricts the use of the sham exception.” ).
15. See id. at 992–93 ( “The pervasiveness of government regulation of drugs, and the fact that
patents are often involved, makes this a particularly attractive area for firms to claim protection under
the Noerr doctrine when they misuse government processes in order to impede competition.” );
Matthew Avery, William Newsom & Brian Hahn, The Antitrust Implications of Filing “Sham” Citizens
Petitions with the FDA, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 132 ( 2013 ) ( “Professional Real Estate and
Noerr-Pennington thus seem to provide an avenue for delaying citizen petitions without fear of antitrust
liability.” ); Saami Zain, Antitrust Liability for Maintaining Baseless Litigation, 54 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 729, 745 ( 2014 ) ( analyzing pharmaceutical patent litigations and arguing that “such litigation
has the potential to be anticompetitive by delaying generic competition” ).
16. See Avery et al., supra note 15, at 116 ( “Once a pharmaceutical product loses patent
protection, competitors almost always introduce generic versions of the drug as quickly as possible.
Generic drugs can capture eighty to ninety percent of the market within months of entering the
marketplace. In response to this intense generic competition, patent holders have used a variety of
controversial means to effectively extend their patent-granted monopoly.” ).
17. See David Orozco, Strategic Legal Bullying, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 137, 139 ( 2016 ) ( “For
example, companies exploit the law when they engage in sham litigation to deter market entry to
start-up innovators . . . . ” ); see also Lao, supra note 14, at 995 ( “Because generic versions cut deeply into
the sales of brand name drugs, brand name drug manufacturers have aggressively used judicial and
regulatory processes to block or delay their approval.” ( citing Gardiner Harris & Chris Adams, Delayed
Reaction: Drug Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks that Slow Generics, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2001, at
A1 ( discussing brand name drug manufacturers’ aggressive courtroom and regulatory tactics that are
used to delay generic drugs’ entry into the market ) ) ).

Second to printer_Hakun.docx (Do Not Delete)

2022 ]

STRATEGIC LITIGATION

8/23/2022 3:16 PM

869

In recent years, Congress even investigated the impact of predatory litigation.18
At the 2012 Judiciary Subcommittee hearing, entitled Litigation as a Predatory
Practice, speakers explained that the doctrine is out of balance, “effectively
immunizes unfounded litigation,” and that the hurdles the victimized party must
overcome to pursue antitrust claims based on “predatory litigation have been set
too high by the courts.”19 As a result, corporations are unaccountable.20 Professor
Lao, who testified, expounded on the “murky” PRE standard and focused on the
situations where the doctrine has “gone beyond the bounds of what the First
Amendment is protecting.”21 Even abusive patent litigation was discussed.22
However, no complete solutions were proposed.
The difficulty with prosecuting predatory litigation is that mixed motives are
often at play.23 On the one hand, the predator seeks to inflict an anticompetitive
injury on its competitor for its own advantage.24 On the other, it seeks to sue a
competitor in court for, ostensibly, a legitimate grievance. This tension has baffled
courts.25 Noerr-Pennington’s uncertain foundation as a constitutional or statutory

18. See Litigation as a Predatory Practice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., Competition,
& the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3 ( 2012 ) ( statement of Hon. Bob
Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., Competition, & the Internet ) ( “Unfortunately,
the courts have liberally applied Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity to litigation and have construed
the sham litigation exception to that doctrine very narrowly. As a result, abusive litigation persists as a
predatory anticompetitive tactic. Today’s hearing will explore this problem and how to address it.” ).
19. Id. at 9 ( testimony of J. Douglas Richards, Partner, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC ).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 31 ( testimony of Marina Lao, Professor of L., Seton Hall Univ. Sch. of L. ).
22. Id. at 33 ( testimony of J. Douglas Richards ) ( “And you really need, desperately, in this
country a legal standard to identify the situations in which brand-name drug manufacturers under those
circumstances are held accountable because the patent claim is unfounded. That is very important.” ).
23. See Lao, supra note 14, at 1026 ( “Very few lawsuits, even objectively baseless ones, would
likely satisfy this test because most litigants have mixed motives, and it would be difficult to show that
the litigant pursued the claim purely for the harassment of a competitor through the process and not in
part for the outcome.” ).
24. Gary Myers, Litigation as a Predatory Practice, 80 KY. L.J. 565, 586 ( 1992 ) ( “Abusive
litigation, like any predatory practice, might serve several anticompetitive purposes: eliminating
competitors, discipling competitors, raising rivals’ costs, or creating barriers to entry.” ).
25. See Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1177,
1219–20 ( 1992 ) (discussing the difficulty in deciding antitrust petitioning immunity when a court must
determine whether the legitimate and anticompetitive motives’ “conflict is so severe that the
competitive process ( and the antitrust review that ensures it ) should yield to the process for providing
input to governmental decisions” ).

Second to printer_Hakun.docx (Do Not Delete)

870

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

8/23/2022 3:16 PM

[ Vol. 12:865

doctrine also adds confusion.26 Even though the Sherman Act is a statute, its role
as the protector of the free market heightens its importance.27
Prior literature has focused on critiquing PRE’s broad language as the
foundation for reforming the sham standard. In particular, Justice Thomas’s
inconsistent baselessness standards have been a large focus of academic debate.28
Others have written proposals using complex game-theory models designed to
articulate predatory suits without considering court-usability.29 At least one scholar
has advocated for the wholesale elimination of the doctrine.30 Even the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) is unclear about how best to resolve these ambiguities.31
As a result, existing scholarly debate has either missed the purpose of petitioning
immunity or proposed a solution beyond the abilities of the courts to enact.32
26. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, Developments in Antitrust and the First Amendment: The
Disaggregation of Noerr, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 330 (1988 ) ( “Some commentators and courts have
read this record and concluded that, whatever its origins, the Noerr doctrine is now a matter of
constitutional law; yet others continue to insist that it is a creature of statutory interpretation.” ); Lao,
supra note 14, at 969 (“The analysis depends, in part, on the doctrine’s foundational basis. If it is rooted
in the Constitution, then the First Amendment would provide the analytical framework, and immunity
should be no broader than the constitutional mandate. If it is based on statutory construction, however,
guidance would have to come from the Sherman Act itself.” ).
27. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 ( 1972 ) ( “Antitrust laws in general,
and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the
preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.” ).
28. See Lao, supra note 14, at 1025 ( “With respect to the objective baselessness test, as Justice
Souter pointed out in his concurrence, ‘probable cause’ and the ‘reasonable litigant’ formulation are
not the same. A case can have some minimal merit—sufficient to avoid the label ‘lack of probable
cause’—and yet a reasonable litigant could not realistically expect success. To the extent that the
majority opinion seems to adopt the probable cause standard for its objective baselessness test, it overly
restricts the use of the sham exception. Litigation that is not without probable cause can, nonetheless,
be used for improper purposes, as the existence of the common law abuse of process tort demonstrates.
Therefore, instead of inquiring if an underlying suit had probable cause, I suggest asking if the suit
is such that ‘no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits,’ and if the suit
was used as an anticompetitive tactic.” ); see also Karen Roche, Deference or Destruction? Reining in the
Noerr-Pennington and State Action Doctrines, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1295, 1342 ( 2012 ) (“‘Objectively
baseless’ should therefore mean that there is no reasonable expectation of success. This would help
limit the number of petitions that Noerr immunizes.” ).
29. See, e.g., Ioannis Lianos & Pierre Regibeau, “Sham” Litigation: When Can It Arise and How
Can It Be Reduced?, 64 ANTITRUST BULL. 643, 643–89 ( 2017 ); Lucia Helena Salgado & Rafal Pinho de
Morais, A New Test for Anticompetitive Litigation ( March 2013 ) ( working paper ) (on file with
author ); Christopher C. Klein, Anticompetitive Litigation and Antitrust Liability ( August 2007 )
( working paper ) ( on file with the Middle Tennessee State University ).
30. Tim Wu, Antitrust & Corruption: Overruling Noerr ( Columbia L. Sch. Pub. L. Working
Paper, Paper No. 14-663, 2020 ), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2666
[ https://perma.cc/2WCZ-S2QY ].
31. John D. Harkrider, Antitrust in the Trump Administration: A Tough Enforcer That Believes
in Limited Government, ANTITRUST, Summer 2018, at 11, 13–14 ( “In February 2017, the FTC filed a
case against Shire ViroPharma seeking to narrow the immunity under Noerr-Pennington. Part of the
FTC’s reason for bringing this case is to further cement the California Motor ‘pattern of petitioning’
exception to the Professional Real Estate Investors decision’s ‘objectively baseless’ test.” ).
32. See Leslie, supra note 2, at 286 ( “[ F]ederal judges may not be the best evaluators of business
rationality for several related reasons, including the fact that most judges (1 ) have no relevant business
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This Article argues that, within the existing framework of Noerr-Pennington, a
more robust standard exists that will unify the conflicting ideas of courts and
economists.33 The core of predatory litigation is that whenever someone uses
“the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an
anticompetitive weapon,” there should be consequences.34 My proposal combines
existing Supreme Court doctrine, the body of economic analysis on predatory
litigation, and objective evidence to create “an enquiry meet for the case” of
prosecuting predatory litigation.35
Part I of this Article examines the history of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and
lays out the current legal framework for antitrust petitioning immunity in the
litigation context up to the Third Circuit’s September 2020 AbbVie decision. Part
II describes the underlying economic foundation of predatory litigation, its different
forms, and its impact on competition. Part III discusses the discrepancies between
the legal framework and economic realities of Strategic litigation and explore how
courts have deviated from the proper analysis. Part IV presents my proposal for
identifying and prosecuting predatory lawsuits through a holistic analysis that
accounts for both the economic and constitutional interests at stake.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF LITIGANTS AND ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
The first formal application of antitrust petitioning immunity was in the
political arena. In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., a
group of railroaders started a publicity campaign to harm their competitors, the rival
truckers.36 The railroaders’ campaign sought to influence government officials to
enact laws that would make it harder for the truckers to compete against the railroad

experience; ( 2 ) are unfamiliar with pertinent economics and historical scholarship on anticompetitive
conduct; ( 3 ) fail to recognize that businesses pursue goals beyond profit maximization; ( 4 ) are unable
to appreciate how it may be rational for firms to intentionally display apparently irrational behavior;
( 5 ) do not consider constraints on business decisionmaking; and ( 6 ) are subject to cognitive biases,
including hindsight bias and confirmation bias.” ).
33. See Christopher C. Klein, Predation in the Courts: Legal Versus Economic Analysis in Sham
Litigation Cases, 10 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 29, 29 (1990 ) ( “The case law frequently defines sham
litigation as anticompetitive litigation that is either ‘baseless’ or fraudulent, whereas economic analysis
emphasizes the anticompetitive goals that motivate the use of government processes to attack rivals.” ).
34. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 ( 1991 ).
35. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780–81 (1999 ); see also Steven C. Salop, An Enquiry
Meet for the Case: Decision Theory, Presumptions, and Evidentiary Burdens in Formulating Antitrust
Legal Standards (Nov. 6, 2017 ) ( working paper ), https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2007/
[ https://perma.cc/DY42-N23P].
36. E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129–31 ( 1961 ).
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industry as well as harm the truckers’ relationship with their customers.37 In short,
the railroaders wanted to eliminate the truckers as competitors.38
Despite the anticompetitive effects of their petitioning, the Supreme Court
immunized the railroaders from antitrust liability. Justice Black concluded that the
railroaders could not be sued because they were petitioning their government
officials for a change in the laws.39 The Court held that any harm to customer
relations was merely incidental to this genuine effort and therefore could not justify
the loss of petitioning immunity.40 This conclusion highlighted the principle that
even methods considered “unethical” could be protected from scrutiny under
this doctrine.41
The Court, foreseeing potential abuses, ensured that immunization was not
absolute. Justice Black explained that “[t]here may be situations in which a publicity
campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere
sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly
with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman
Act would be justified.”42 This case was the birth of the sham exception.
The sham exception was not applied to litigation until over a decade later.43 In
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, a group of truckers conspired
to systematically institute legal proceedings against their competitors to prevent
them from obtaining operating credentials.44 The truckers vowed to file petitions
“‘with or without probable cause, and regardless of the merits of the case’” with
their goal being to harass their rivals and impose delays and costs.45 After forty

37. Id. at 130; see also Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. E. R.R. Presidents Conf., 155 F. Supp. 768,
822 ( E.D. Pa. 1957 ) ( “A cursory reading of the facts as found would quickly indicate that the
destruction of the defendants’ good will was the primary goal of the defendants in their plan to
monopolize the long-haul freight business.” ), rev’d, 365 U.S. 127 ( 1961 ).
38. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129–30 ( “The campaign so conducted was described in the complaint as
‘vicious, corrupt, and fraudulent,’ first, in that the sole motivation behind it was the desire on the part
of the railroads to injure the truckers and eventually to destroy them as competitors in the long-distance
freight business . . . . ” ).
39. Id. at 135 ( “[ N ]o violation of the [ Sherman ] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to
influence the passage or enforcement of laws.” ).
40. Id. at 138–39.
41. Id. at 139–40 ( “We . . . hold that, at least insofar as the railroads’ campaign was directed
toward obtaining governmental action, its legality was not at all affected by any anticompetitive purpose
it may have had.” ).
42. Id. at 144.
43. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 ( 1972 ).
44. Id. at 509 (“The conspiracy alleged is a concerted action by petitioners to institute state and
federal proceedings to resist and defeat applications by respondents to acquire operating rights or to
transfer or register those rights.” ).
45. Id. at 512 ( “It is alleged that petitioners ‘instituted the proceedings and actions . . . with or
without probable cause, and regardless of the merits of the cases.’” ( alteration in original ) ).
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separate cases, over half of them successful for the truckers, their competitors filed
an antitrust suit claiming that these forty cases were anticompetitive shams. 46
Justice Douglas held the truckers’ suits should not receive antitrust petitioning
immunity despite their ostensible legitimacy. He wrote that “First Amendment
rights may not be used as the means or the pretext for achieving ‘substantive
evils.’”47 Since the truckers’ suits induced competitive harm, Justice Douglas held
that they could not rely on the First Amendment for protection.48 As such, this
series of petitions did not receive petitioning immunity.49
While California Motor made clear that the right of access to the courts was
essential, it failed to articulate a clear standard for “sham” suits.50 This left the lower
courts to decide the requirements for antitrust petitioning immunity on their own.
As a result, a wide range of definitions of “sham” lawsuits developed.51
A. The Initial Sham Circuit Split (1972–1993)
In the years following California Motor, circuit courts ruled on antitrust
petitioning immunity without clear guidance. This lack of guidance led to the
development of competing sham litigation theories: some believed the suit’s legal
merit was the key to identifying a sham, while others believed that legal merit was
only one factor.
The first, and larger, group of circuit courts relied on legal merit. Some courts
required a sham to be legally unreasonable, while others reasoned that the test was
whether the lawsuit was obviously meritorious or not.52 Under either theory, the
conclusion was the same. Some courts phrased this as a decision between good and

46. Trucking Unlimited v. Cal. Motor Transp. Co., No. 45073, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11536,
at *5–6 ( N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 1967 ), rev’d on other grounds, 432 F.2d 755 ( 9th Cir. 1970 ), aff’d on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 508 (1972 ).
47. Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 515 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963 ) ).
48. Id. at 515 ( “If these facts are proved, a violation of the antitrust laws has been established.
If the end result is unlawful, it matters not that the means used in violation may be lawful.” ).
49. Id. at 516.
50. Id. at 513 (“Petitioners, of course, have the right of access to the agencies and courts to be
heard on applications sought by competitive highway carriers. That right, as indicated, is part of the
right of petition protected by the First Amendment. Yet that does not necessarily give them immunity
from the antitrust laws.” ).
51. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 507, n.10 ( 1988 )
( noting that the word “sham” might become “no more than a label courts could apply to activity they
deem unworthy of antitrust immunity” ).
52. See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 811–12 ( 2d Cir. 1983 );
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 161 ( 3d Cir. 1984 ); Eden Hannon
& Co. v. Sumitomo Tr. & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 564–65 ( 4th Cir. 1990 ); South Dakota
v. Kan. City S. Indus., Inc., 880 F.2d 40, 48–49 ( 8th Cir. 1989 ); Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand
Corp., 673 F.2d 1171, 1174–75 ( 10th Cir. 1982 ); McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco, Inc., 958 F.2d 1552, 1560
( 11th Cir. 1992 ); Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 663 F.2d 253, 264–65 (D.C. Cir. 1981 ).
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bad faith.53 Others asked whether the case had probable cause.54 Still others merely
asked whether the case was so weak as to be sanctionable under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11.55
On the other end of the spectrum were those circuit courts that believed the
legal merit of a case was not determinative of whether it was a sham. The most
prominent proponent of this theory was Judge Posner.
In Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., Judge Posner explained how a
business that filed a meritorious lawsuit against its competitor could still,
nonetheless, be anticompetitive.56 He opined on how litigants could abuse legal
process in order to harm competitors through delay, cost, or other means.57 Further,
he rejected “the proposition that a nonmalicious lawsuit can never violate antitrust
law” and held that probable cause should not be the standard because sophisticated
litigants could easily circumvent that hurdle.58 Judge Posner argued, instead, to
evaluate the intentions underlying the decision to sue, despite the obvious
challenges such an examination would pose.59
Two other circuits adopted similar positions. The Sixth Circuit held that a
case’s “genuine [legal] substance” raised only “a rebuttable presumption” of
immunity.60 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in In re Burlington Northern, Inc. held that
“success on the merits does not . . . preclude” proof of a sham if it could be
established that the case was not “significantly motivated by a genuine desire for
judicial relief.”61 The core principle expounded by this faction of courts was that an
abuse of the judicial process could still exist alongside a legitimate case. The
Fifth and Sixth Circuits concluded that analysis could not begin and end with the
legal merits.

53. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures, 749 F.2d at 161 ( citing Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 511 ) ( “Only when
resort to the courts is in bad faith and a ‘mere sham’ may antitrust liability be imposed.” ).
54. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1530–31 ( 9th
Cir. 1991 ), cert. granted 503 U.S. 958 ( 1992 ) ( “Because a successful lawsuit involving no fraud upon
the court is obviously based on probable cause, it cannot be a sham as a matter of law.” ).
55. See McGuire Oil, 958 F.2d at 1561 n.12 ( citing Opdyke Inv. Co. v. City of Detroit, 883 F.2d
1265, 1273 ( 6th Cir. 1989 ) ) for the proposition that an “unsuccessful lawsuit [ was ] not a sham where
the trial court did not treat the theory as frivolous and the antitrust plaintiffs did not contend that the
theory of the underlying case was so farfetched as to warrant the imposition of sanctions against the
attorneys who brought it.”
56. Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466 ( 7th Cir. 1982 ).
57. See id. at 472.
58. Id. ( “The existence of a tort of abuse of process shows that it has long been thought that
litigation could be used for improper purposes even when there is probable cause for the litigation; and
if the improper purpose is to use litigation as a tool for suppressing competition in its antitrust sense,
it becomes a matter of antitrust concern.” ) ( internal citations omitted ).
59. Id. ( “[ W ]e are not prepared to rule that the difficulty of distinguishing lawful from unlawful
purpose in litigation between competitors is so acute that such litigation can never be considered an
actionable restraint of trade, provided it has some, though perhaps only threadbare, basis in law.” ).
60. Westmac, Inc. v. Smith, 797 F.2d 313, 318 ( 6th Cir. 1986 ).
61. In re Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 528 ( 5th Cir. 1987 ); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Energy
Transp. Sys., Inc., 484 U.S. 1007 ( 1988 ).
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This circuit split persisted until the Ninth Circuit, in 1992, held that a case filed
with probable cause could never be a sham and that such cases always deserved
antitrust petitioning immunity.62 After twenty years of denied petitions, the Supreme
Court took the PRE case as the bellwether case to attempt to resolve the issue of
antitrust petitioning immunity in the litigation context.63
B. The Supreme Court’s Sham Solution (1993)
The defendants in PRE (collectively, Columbia) filed copyright litigation
against hotel operators (PRE) after the operators started renting Columbia’s films
to their guests.64 PRE filed an antitrust action against Columbia because they
believed the underlying claim was merely an attempt to restrain trade.65 The district
court disagreed that a sham existed, claiming its decision to grant summary
judgment was a close call.66 This close call, it claimed, gave Columbia probable
cause—and immunity.
The Ninth Circuit agreed. It held that “[b]ecause a successful lawsuit involving
no fraud upon the court is obviously based on probable cause, it cannot be a sham
as a matter of law.”67 The court proposed a two-part sham litigation test that
asked first whether the suit was legally baseless and, second, whether it was
brought as “part of an anticompetitive plan external to the underlying litigation.”68
PRE appealed.
On petition to the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority,
affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and declared that his opinion would resolve
the “inconsistent and contradictory ways” lower courts defined sham litigation.69
The solution, he ordered, was to endorse the Ninth Circuit’s suggested two-step
plan based on probable cause.
The first step was deciding if the case was “objectively baseless in the sense
that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”70 If not
objectively baseless, the case would receive antitrust petitioning immunity and the

62. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1530–31 ( 9th
Cir. 1991 ), cert. granted 503 U.S. 958 ( 1992 ).
63. See PRE, 508 U.S. 49 (1993 ).
64. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 279 ( 9th
Cir. 1989 ) ( “Mancha hotel guests may rent movie videodiscs from the lobby gift shop for a $5 to $7.50
daily fee per disc, which can be charged on the hotel bill . . . . After learning of these activities at La
Mancha, Columbia Pictures, Inc. and six other motion picture studios ( ‘Columbia’ ) filed suit to prevent
La Mancha from renting videodiscs to its guests, alleging copyright infringement.” ) ( footnote omitted ).
65. Columbia Pictures, 944 F.2d at 1527.
66. Id. at 1528.
67. Id. at 1530–31 ( citing Omni Res. Dev. Corp. v. Conoco, Inc., 739 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th
Cir. 1984 ) ).
68. Id. at 1532.
69. PRE, 508 U.S. 49, 55 (1993 ).
70. Id. at 60.
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inquiry would end.71 If, on the other hand, the case was objectively baseless,
the second element would come into play. This element asked whether the litigant
used “‘the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as
an anticompetitive weapon.’”72 This element received little attention from
Justice Thomas.
Justice Thomas focused on objective baselessness and equated it to probable
cause like the Ninth Circuit. He declared California Motor as holding that there was
an “indispensable objective component” to the sham exception and that, as such,
“challenges to allegedly sham petitioning activity must be resolved according to
objective criteria.”73 That criteria, he decided, was probable cause, which “requires
no more than ‘a reasonabl[e] belie[f] that there is a chance that [a] claim may be held
valid upon adjudication.’”74
Justice Thomas’s focus on probable cause led him to draw comparisons
between accusations of sham litigation and malicious prosecution. Because
malicious prosecution was inappropriate whenever probable cause existed, Justice
Thomas ruled that the existence of probable cause was an absolute defense to
an allegation of sham litigation.75 Interestingly, Justice Thomas also connected
probable cause and objective baselessness with sanctions under Rule 11 by saying
that since Columbia’s copyright action was, at least, an objectively “good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,” the action
was not baseless.76 For all of these reasons, Justice Thomas held that Columbia’s
infringement case had merit and that, therefore, it could not be an anticompetitive
sham.77 Columbia was given antitrust petitioning immunity for its claim.78
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion because of his strong disagreement
with Justice Thomas’s opinion, despite his agreement with the result that
Columbia’s infringement suit was not a sham.79 First and foremost, Justice Stevens

71. Justice Thomas went further and even cautioned courts against considering a losing claim
as being objectively baseless. Id. at 60 n.5 ( “A winning lawsuit is by definition a reasonable effort at
petitioning for redress and therefore not a sham. On the other hand, when the antitrust defendant has
lost the underlying litigation, a court must ‘resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc
reasoning by concluding’ that an ultimately unsuccessful ‘action must have been unreasonable or
without foundation.’” ).
72. Id. at 61 (quoting City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 ( 1990 ) ).
73. Id. at 58–59.
74. Id. at 62–63 ( internal citations omitted ).
75. Id. at 63 ( “Because the absence of probable cause is an essential element of the tort, the
existence of probable cause is an absolute defense.” ).
76. Id. at 65 ( quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11 ).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 67 ( Stevens J., concurring ) ( “While I agree with the Court’s disposition of this case
and with its holding that ‘an objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be sham regardless of
subjective intent,’ I write separately to disassociate myself from some of the unnecessarily broad dicta
in the Court’s opinion.” ) ( internal citations omitted ).

Second to printer_Hakun.docx (Do Not Delete)

2022 ]

STRATEGIC LITIGATION

8/23/2022 3:16 PM

877

disagreed that probable cause should guarantee antitrust petitioning immunity.80 He
believed that “objectively reasonable lawsuits may still break the law.”81
Justice Stevens fundamentally disagreed with Justice Thomas’s formulation of
how to identify whether litigation was anticompetitive. He explained that the term
“sham” is “appropriately applied to a case, or series of cases, in which the plaintiff
is indifferent to the outcome of the litigation itself, but has nevertheless sought
to impose a collateral harm on the defendant.”82 The key distinction, he wrote,
should be whether the chance of success on the merits was the motivation for the
suit versus the collateral anticompetitive benefit.83 He echoed Judge Posner’s
proposition that some cases would not be filed without such a collateral benefit.84
The final—and most fundamental—problem Justice Stevens articulated with
Justice Thomas’s rigid two-step structure for antitrust petitioning immunity was that
the facts were a poor bellwether of predatory litigation.85 Justice Stevens pointed
out that, regardless of which circuit this case had arisen from, every court would
have granted petitioning immunity for Columbia.86 Justice Stevens warned that
courts would be faced with much “more complicated” cases and that Justice
Thomas was wrong to draft such a strong rule from an “easy case.”87 Nonetheless,
Justice Stevens concluded that Columbia’s infringement claim against PRE was not
a sham and that immunity was appropriate.
Since PRE, the Supreme Court has not heard another case on sham litigation.
In the almost thirty-year silence since PRE, the circuit courts are again tasked with
deciding when and how to grant antitrust petitioning immunity to litigants accused
of abusing the judicial process. Now, the problem facing the lower courts is whether
PRE overturned California Motor and, if not, how two cases that fundamentally
contradict one another can coexist.
80. Id. at 67–68 (“Specifically, I disagree with the Court’s equation of ‘objectively baseless’ with
the answer to the question whether any ‘reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the
merits.’ There might well be lawsuits that fit the latter definition but can be shown to be objectively
unreasonable, and thus shams. It might not be objectively reasonable to bring a lawsuit just
because some form of success on the merits—no matter how insignificant—could be expected.” )
( footnote omitted ).
81. Id. at 75 (“It is important to remember that the distinction between ‘sham’ litigation and
genuine litigation is not always, or only, the difference between lawful and unlawful conduct; objectively
reasonable lawsuits may still break the law.” ).
82. Id. at 68.
83. Id. (“The distinction between abusing the judicial process to restrain competition and
prosecuting a lawsuit that, if successful, will restrain competition must guide any court’s decision
whether a particular filing, or series of filings, is a sham.” ).
84. Id. at 73–75 ( quoting Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 ( 7th
Cir. 1982 ) ).
85. Id. at 69 ( “There was no unethical or other improper use of the judicial system; instead,
respondents invoked the federal court’s jurisdiction to determine whether they could lawfully restrain
competition with petitioners.” ).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 68, 76 ( “I would not, however, use this easy case as a vehicle for announcing a
rule that may govern the decision of difficult cases, some of which may involve abuse of the
judicial process.” ).
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C. The Current State of Sham Litigation (1993–Present)
Since PRE, the Supreme Court has left the circuit courts to wrestle with the
issue of deciding what standard governs antitrust petitioning immunity. Based on
PRE’s holding that probable cause is an absolute defense to allegations of sham
litigation, California Motor—which rejected immunity for cases filed “with or
without probable cause”—should be doctrinally dead. Despite this contradiction,
circuit courts have latched onto allowing both cases to coexist and have begun
distinguishing them based on the factual differences underlying the cases.88
For example, the Third Circuit adopted this approach in Hanover 3201 Realty,
LLC v. Village Supermarkets, Inc., where a realty company faced a series of legal
challenges it alleged were “designed to keep [its client] out of the market.”89 The
court held that whenever a party alleged a series of legal proceedings, the California
Motor standard should govern, and when only one sham is alleged, it will use PRE’s
“exacting two-step test [which] properly places a heavy thumb on the scale in favor
of the defendant.”90
These courts deemed the quantity of suits to be the “best way to make that
determination” because, otherwise, “it is difficult to determine with any precision
whether the petition was anticompetitive,” and they wanted to “prevent any undue
chilling of First Amendment activity.”91 Because multiple petitions existed, the
Third Circuit chose the California Motor approach and engaged in a “holistic” review
of factors, like the win-loss percentage of the petitions.92 It also considered evidence
of bad faith, such as the “magnitude and nature of the collateral harm imposed on
plaintiffs by defendants’ petitioning activity.”93
In Hanover, this led to a denial of antitrust petitioning immunity because it was
sufficiently alleged that the defendants instituted the proceedings and actions
without regard to the merits of the cases.94 This standard, however, is not actually

88. See, e.g., Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 179 (3d
Cir. 2015 ); Waugh Chapel S., LLC v. United Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 27, 728 F.3d 354, 363
( 4th Cir. 2013 ); Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 99–101 ( 2d Cir. 2000 );
USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 31 F.3d 800,
810–11 ( 9th Cir. 1994 ).
89. Hanover, 806 F.3d at 170.
90. Id. at 180 (When a single case is at issue and the PRE test is used “the analysis is
retrospective: if the alleged sham petition is not objectively baseless, defendants are immune—end
of story.” ).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 181. The court then compared its win-loss percentage with other courts who had done
a similar “analysis.” See, e.g., Waugh, 728 F.3d at 365 ( finding sham where one of fourteen proceedings
was successful ); USS–POSCO, 31 F.3d at 811 ( finding no sham where fifteen of twenty-nine lawsuits
were successful ); Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1046 ( 9th
Cir. 2009 ) ( finding no sham where defendant “won seven of the seventeen suits” and each of the ten
remaining cases “had a plausible argument on which it could have prevailed” ).
94. Hanover, 806 F.3d at 183 ( quoting Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 516 ( 1972 ) ).
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equipped to handle the “more complicated cases” Justice Stevens warned of.95 The
most egregious example of this is the recent Third Circuit decision of FTC
v. AbbVie.96
In AbbVie, the defendant pharmaceutical company initiated two patent
infringement lawsuits against competitors Teva and Perrigo when the rival
companies filed applications with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
produce nearly identical generic drugs97 based on AbbVie’s patent before its
expiration.98 The benefit of these suits, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, was that they
automatically imposed a thirty-month stay on Teva and Perrigo’s FDA approval,
thereby allowing AbbVie’s monopoly to continue.99
After both suits settled quickly with large settlements, the FTC filed an
antitrust claim against AbbVie and claimed that the suits were shams.100 AbbVie
argued that under PRE, it had antitrust petitioning immunity. The district court
disagreed and held that both suits were shams after an extensive summary judgment
opinion and a sixteen-day bench trial.101 The district court concluded that, legally,
AbbVie had no “reasonable belief” of success on the merits based on existing patent
law and that, as such, its claims were “objectively baseless” under PRE.102 The court

95. Id. at 181.
96. FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 329 F. Supp. 3d 98, 117–18 ( E.D. Pa. 2018 ), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
and remanded, 976 F.3d 327 ( 3d Cir. 2020 ).
97. To market a pharmaceutical product, the drug must obtain FDA approval. Approval can
come in three ways: a Section 505( b )( 1 ) “Full” New Drug Application, a Section 505( j ) “Abbreviated”
New Drug Application, or a Section 505( b )( 2 ) “Hybrid” New Drug Application. See Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505, 21 U.S.C. § 505 ( b )( 1 )–( 2 ), ( j ). The Abbreviated application is a
“streamlined application” that is “appropriate for a company seeking to market a generic version of a
brand-name drug.” AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d at 339. To file, the manufacturer must certify that “the
manufacture, use, or sale of the generic will not infringe patents relating to the brand-name drug,
or that those patents are invalid.” 21 U.S.C. § 355( j )( 2 )( A )( vii )( IV ). This is a “paragraph IV
certification.” AbbVie Inc., 329 F. Supp. 3d at 108. The first applicant to receive Abbreviated Approval
from the FDA enjoys “180 days of exclusivity” during which “no other generic can compete with the
brand-name drug.” FTC v. Actavis Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 143–44 ( 2013 ). This period can be worth “several
hundred million dollars.” Id. at 144.
98. See AbbVie, 976 F.3d at 339–40 ( “The Hatch-Waxman Act also has provisions that
encourage the quick resolution of patent disputes. A paragraph IV notice ‘automatically counts as patent
infringement.’ After receiving this notice, a patentee has 45 days to decide whether to sue.” ) ( internal
citations omitted ).
99. See id. at 340 ( “The automatic, 30-month stay creates tension with the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
procompetitive goals. Simply by suing, a patentee can delay the introduction of low-cost generic drugs
to market and impede competition in the pharmaceutical industry.” ).
100. Id. at 338 (“The FTC alleged that Defendants filed sham patent infringement suits against
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. and Perrigo Company, and that AbbVie, Abbott, and Unimed entered
into an anticompetitive reverse-payment agreement with Teva. The FTC accused Defendants of trying
to monopolize and restrain trade over AndroGel.” ).
101. FTC v. AbbVie Inc., No. CV 14-5151, 2017 WL 4098688 ( E.D. Pa., Sept. 15, 2017 )
( Bartle, J. ) and FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 329 F. Supp. 3d at 106 ( “Thereafter the court held an
approximately three-week nonjury trial on the issues of subjective intent and monopoly power. The
court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.” ).
102. AbbVie Inc., 2017 WL 4098688, at *11.
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also held that AbbVie intended to interfere with competition and that the financial
value of delaying entry motivated its decision to litigate.103
The Third Circuit disagreed and held that AbbVie’s suit against Teva was
not a sham because it was not entirely legally baseless under PRE.104 Judge
Hardiman, writing for the court, explained the difficulty of his decision by opining
how a plaintiff seeking to prove sham litigation faces an “uphill battle” in the
pharmaceutical context because of the incentives presented by the Hatch-Waxman
Act.105 Nonetheless, he concluded, it was possible for a sham suit to exist, but
warned that “the defendant’s First Amendment right” to petition the government
was at stake.106
The decision to overturn the district court’s determination that the Teva suit
was objectively baseless was based on PRE’s explanation that the existence of
probable cause to file a lawsuit, even when the law is decidedly against the
underlying plaintiff’s position, is an absolute defense. Judge Hardiman explained
that, under PRE, “the more ‘unsettled’ the law is, the more reasonable is a belief
that a claim will be held valid” under Rule 11.107 Despite the district court’s
thorough analysis of the relevant patent law at issue, Judge Hardiman explained that
the law was not so against AbbVie that its suits violated Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.108 This low floor, he held, gave the case probable cause and precluded
a finding of sham litigation.109
The result of this was that AbbVie’s subjective intent about its decision to sue
Teva was ignored.110 In contrast, because of a slight factual wrinkle, the Perrigo suit
103. AbbVie Inc., 329 F. Supp. 3d at 126. Judge Bartle concluded that “the only reason for the
filing of these lawsuits was to impose expense and delay on Teva and Perrigo so as to block their entry
into the TTRT market with lower price generics and to delay defendants’ impending loss of hundreds
of millions of dollars in AndroGel sales and profits.” Id.
104. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d at 361.
105. Id. The uphill battle exists because the submission of an ANDA is, by definition, an
infringing act which “could only be objectively baseless if no reasonable person could disagree with
the assertions of noninfringement or invalidity in the certification.” In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust
Litig. Indirect Purchaser Class, 868 F.3d 132, 149 (3d Cir. 2017 ).
106. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d at 361 ( “The automatic, 30-month stay is a collateral injury the
defendant’s mere use of legal process invariably inflicts. And though the stay ends if a court holds the
defendant’s patent is invalid or has not been infringed, it does not otherwise depend on a suit’s outcome.
Thus, a plaintiff may be able to show a defendant was indifferent to the outcome of its infringement
suit, and the automatic, 30-month stay was an anticompetitive weapon the defendant tried to wield.” ).
107. Id. at 360 ( quoting PRE, 508 U.S. 49, 64–65 ( probable cause supports a claim if it is
“arguably ‘warranted by existing law’” ) ( quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11 ) ).
108. Id. at 365. For example, Hardiman explained that one of the FTC’s arguments was “not so
strong as to make the suits objectively unreasonable” and that AbbVie “could reasonably have argued the
rule did not apply or should be modified . . . Thus, a reasonable litigant in AbbVie[ ‘s] . . . position
would not necessarily see this rule as foreclosing its claim.” ( emphasis added ) ( first citing PRE, 508
U.S. at 65; and then quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11 ). This, he decided, was enough to have probable cause
and receive petitioning immunity.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 366 ( “Thus, the District Court erred in concluding AbbVie and Besins’s suit against
Teva was objectively baseless. Accordingly, we will not consider the subjective motivation prong as to
Teva.” ) ( citing PRE, 508 U.S. at 60–61 ).
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was affirmed under PRE as both objectively baseless and subjectively motivated to
be anticompetitive.111 Because of PRE and probable cause, the Teva suit was
immunized while otherwise identical conduct, valued at $448 million, was found to
be a sham.112 The Supreme Court has declined to intervene.
D. The Unresolved Doctrinal Disputes
The AbbVie decision exemplifies many of the concerns Justice Stevens
explored in his PRE concurrence. First, Justice Stevens warned Justice Thomas
that courts could disagree on what constituted objective baselessness.113 This
disagreement is exactly what led to the Third Circuit’s reversal of the district court
in AbbVie. District Judge Bartle believed that no reasonable litigant would expect to
have succeeded with AbbVie’s facts and the existing law and that, as such, the case
was objectively baseless. However, on appeal, Judge Hardiman set the baseline to
whether AbbVie’s claims violated Rule 11.
AbbVie also raises other questions about the PRE standard. Was the marginal
difference between the legal basis of the Teva suit and the Perrigo suit enough to
overcome the strong subjective evidence that AbbVie had the same clearly
anticompetitive intent when it filed the Teva suit? Also, could the Third Circuit
have chosen to consider AbbVie’s conduct as a series of petitions instead of two
separate lawsuits and analyzed it under the California Motor standard? Would doing
so have changed the outcome?
The bedrock principle of antitrust petitioning immunity is to protect those
who petition the government for legitimate reasons and at the same time prosecute
those who seek to use “‘the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that
process—as an anticompetitive weapon.’”114 Unfortunately, this is not the standard
courts are using to evaluate allegations of sham litigation.
The PRE test immunizes anyone who can draft a lawsuit that beats Rule 11
sanctions and is deemed to have “probable cause.” This standard, thought to be
objective by some, is seen by others as nothing more than allowing the subjective
whims of a judge to decide what does or does not have “enough” legal merit.115
111. Id. at 368 ( “Thus, the District Court did not err in concluding AbbVie and Besins’s suit
against Perrigo was objectively baseless.” ).
112. The District Court dismissed the FTC’s claims to the extent they relied on a
reverse-payment theory but found Defendants liable for monopolization on the sham-litigation theory.
The court ordered Defendants to disgorge $448 million in ill-gotten profits but denied the FTC’s
request for an injunction. The Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s order for disgorgement of
the $448 million.
113. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens wrote that the facts of PRE were obviously not an
anticompetitive sham suit and that “the original copyright infringement action was objectively
reasonable—and the District Court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court all agree that it was.” PRE,
508 U.S. at 69 ( Stevens, J., concurring ).
114. Id. at 61 ( emphasis in original ) ( quoting City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc.,
499 U.S. 365, 380 ( 1991 ) ).
115. Elhauge, supra note 25, at 1232 ( “One asks whether the chances of winning were
‘reasonable,’ which can be much the same as asking whether there was ‘probable cause’ to bring the
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Courts willing to flex their creative muscles can find a way to articulate some theory
under which the antitrust defendant’s claim does not violate Rule 11 and is
immunized under PRE. On the flip side, a court interested in holding the same
defendant accountable could state that the law is so flimsy that “no reasonable
litigant” should expect success, and therefore the case does not warrant petitioning
immunity.116 The PRE standard is unclear and, on top of that, focuses on the wrong
issue entirely.
This Article provides a solution to courts for how to approach allegations of
sham litigation in both easy cases like PRE and hard cases like AbbVie. My solution
keeps both PRE and California Motor intact, while ensuring that analysis focuses on
exposing the underlying intent behind the suit. The proposal drives at the question
of whether the litigation was instituted because of a legitimate desire for success on
the merits or merely as a Trojan Horse to harm competition.
Before proposing my solution to the doctrine of antitrust petitioning immunity
in the litigation context, it is essential to introduce the concept of anticompetitive
litigation from a different angle. As such, Part II examines anticompetitive litigation
from the perspective of economics.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF ANTICOMPETITIVE LITIGATION
Actions that are designed primarily to destroy, harm, or otherwise hinder
competition instead of improving efficiency through competition in the
marketplace are considered “predatory” or “exclusionary” under our antitrust
laws.117 Historically, antitrust literature has focused on predatory pricing, whereby a
firm sets its sales price below cost to drive out a weaker firm.118 The standard for
determining whether to prosecute predatory pricing was the “profit sacrifice” test,
which asked whether the decrease in price was rational or if the litigant was actually
motivated by a desire to harm a competitor.119
While many scholars debate the viability of predatory pricing in the real world,
non-price predation has taken hold as a popular and viable theory of anticompetitive

suit. This test entails examining the extent of legal and factual support for the party’s position . . . . [ I ]t
is hard to see what plausible test based on the chances of winning could possibly explain excluding a
litigant with a 52.5% success rate, as California Motor did. If, in response to these problems, one
interprets the reasonable expectation test as referring to something other than the likelihood of success,
then the test offers no guidance at all because which expectations are ‘reasonable’ becomes a completely
conclusory judgment.” ).
116. PRE, 508 U.S. at 60.
117. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 ( “If a firm has been
‘attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,’ it is fair to characterize its behavior
as predatory.” ) ( citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 348–49 ( 1978 ) ); see also Myers, supra note 24, at 579.
118. Myers, supra note 24, at 584–86.
119. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 602.
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action.120 Examples of non-price predation include excessive advertising, excess
capacity, tying products, and predatory litigation tactics.
Such predatory litigation tactics should be deterred, but, as I explained in Part
I, litigants employing them are too often rewarded with petitioning immunity. As
such, this Part of the Article discusses the economic logic behind predatory litigation
and then proposes a mathematical model for defining the different forms predatory
litigation can take.
A. The Theory of Predatory Litigation
Litigation designed to impose burdens on an opponent’s ability to compete
can be considered predatory. Predatory litigation, like other forms of non-price
predation, can serve many anticompetitive functions, such as excluding, disciplining,
raising costs, and delaying or deterring entry.121 Any of these improper goals
would show that the predator-litigant was not solely motivated by the merits of its
suit. But an anticompetitive motive alone is not enough to state an actionable
antitrust claim.
A predatory litigant must also meet the elements of the underlying antitrust
violation in order to be prosecuted. The most common claim is a violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act122 and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.123 To establish a violation of section 2, the predatory litigant must be shown to
also (1) have monopoly power and (2) have willfully maintained that power.124
Distinguishing predatory behavior from competition on the merits is not
always easy. The fact that predatory litigation does not directly raise prices, for
example, makes such suits harder to identify.125 Ostensibly, filing a lawsuit against
a competitor is permissible under the First Amendment and shows no outward signs
of predatory intent.

120. See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE. L.J. 209 ( 1986 ).
121. Gary Myers, Antitrust and First Amendment Implications of Professional Real Estate
Investors, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1199, 1201–02 ( 1994 ) ( “Predatory litigation can serve several
possible anticompetitive functions, including eliminating or disciplining competitors, raising rivals’
costs, and delaying or deterring entry into a market. From an economic standpoint, when a litigant
brings suit for one of these reasons ( rather than in an effort to prevail in the courtroom ), the suit is
predatory and threatens competition on the merits.” ).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . . ” ).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 45( a )( 1 ) ( “Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce . . . are
hereby declared unlawful.” ).
124. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 ( 1966 ) ( “The offense of monopoly
under §2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: ( 1 ) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and ( 2 ) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” ).
125. Myers, supra note 24, at 596–97.
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Those who engage in predatory litigation are always seeking an anticompetitive
goal. These goals could include eliminating or disciplining a competitor, raising
rivals’ costs, or delaying or deterring a rival’s entry into the marketplace. These goals
are more easily achieved through predatory litigation than other forms of non-price
predation. The predator-plaintiff has the benefit of deciding the claims to pursue,
drafting the complaint, and choosing the forum in which to file. Furthermore, the
defendant then cannot escape the predator-plaintiff’s claim unless it can succeed by
proving the claim is entirely improper as a matter of law or, only after costly
discovery, that there is no genuine dispute of a material fact. These legal barriers
make it easier for the predator-plaintiff to institute a predatory claim than for the
defendant to escape one.
These inherent complications with our justice system make it more difficult
to identify predatory lawsuits than other forms of predation. As such, it is helpful
to identify foundational principles that exist in almost all, if not all, instances of
predatory litigation.
Predatory litigation will be most successful and prevalent when three market
factors are met.126 The first market factor is that the party instituting suit be a
dominant firm or conspiratorial group such that it has market power.127 This factor
dovetails nicely into the requirements of a monopolization claim, where the antitrust
defendant must be found to have market power. The second factor is that the
defendant is “a recent or potential entrant or a competitor.”128 This market factor
drives directly to the types of anticompetitive motives driving the predator. The
third factor is that the “effect of the plaintiff’s action is to prevent or delay entry or
expansion by the defendant, or to cause exit.”129 In instances where a firm is intent
on keeping its market power, exclusionary conduct such as deterring entry would
best be imposed on those competitors without strong footholds in the market.
Consider how these market factors exist in several prominent petitioning
immunity cases seen in Part I. In AbbVie, the patent-holding pharmaceutical
company obviously has market power by virtue of its intellectual property
monopoly. AbbVie’s infringement suits were directed at two new entrants, Teva
and Perrigo, and the direct effect of the institution of those suits was to impose a
thirty-month delay on their entry. All three market factors are clearly met. Likewise,
in PRE, Columbia was a patent-holding monopolist. The goal of Columbia’s suit
was to exclude PRE from the video rental market, although that result would only
come about through a verdict, unlike the suits in AbbVie. This distinction will
become more important later in the Article.
These three market factors serve to help identify situations where a lawsuit is
more or less likely to be a predatory suit. These criteria alone do not determine

126.
127.
128.
129.

See Klein, supra note 9, at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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whether a claim is predatory. To actually be predatory, litigation must involve either
fraud or some external anticompetitive goal that is motivating the predation. To
illustrate this concept, I introduce a series of equations, inspired by the works of
Gary Myers and Christopher Klein, to explain how an otherwise rational lawsuit can
be corrupted by a predatory motive.
B. A Model of Predatory Litigation
Competitors are rational actors that always act to maximize profits.130
Economists religiously131 analyze allegedly anticompetitive actions through the lens
of rational-choice theory,132 such that it has become “a routine and almost
unexamined part of every economist’s intellectual tool kit.”133 This assumption and
the mathematical tools that come with it have been applied to explain the economic
motivations underlying a competitor’s decision to sue.134
Law-and-economics scholars, armed with rational-choice theory, have derived
the potential forms of predatory litigation.135 Within this framework, litigation
between competitors can be categorized into one of three categories: Legitimate,
Fraudulent, or Strategic.136
Presumptively, all litigation is Legitimate. Legitimate litigation is the typical,
appropriate lawsuit that is “instituted on the basis of expected direct benefits from
nonfraudulent success on the merits.”137 It is a proper suit. Fraudulent litigation,
in contrast, is “pursued because of benefits due to deception” and is universally
rebuked by economists and jurists.138 Finally, Strategic litigation is a suit motivated,
at least in part, by a collateral goal that is not impacted by the results of the litigation.
To best understand these forms of litigation, several equations are helpful.
The first inequality represents a Legitimate, and rational, lawsuit. This is used
to represent the “honest nonstrategic plaintiff” who sues only when the expected
value of winning in court (x is probability of success multiplied by J, the monetary

130. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 113 ( 5th ed. 2020 ) ( “[ B ]usiness firms are ( or
must be assumed to be ) profit maximizers.” ).
131. See Leslie, supra note 2, at 265 ( “As a result of the dominating influence of law and
economics scholars, antitrust law now worships at the shrine of rationality. Rationality serves as the
foundation for most model building and policy prescriptions within the law and economics school, as
evidenced by such concepts as the rational actor theory and rational choice theory.” ).
132. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 134 (2005 ) ( “The entire antitrust
enterprise is dedicated to the proposition that business firms behave rationally.” ).
133. Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
487, 488 (1994 ) ( reviewing RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS ( 1991 ) and
RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC
LIFE ( 1992 ) ).
134. See Myers, supra note 24, at 602.
135. Klein, supra note 9, at 17–20.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 24.
138. See id.; Myers, supra note 24, at 602.
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value of judgment), exceeds the cost of litigation (C) including “attorneys’ fees,
court costs, expert witness fees, time spent by employees on the litigation, travel,
and other miscellaneous expenses.”139
(1)

xJ > C

Legitimate Suit

For example, a plaintiff who believes she has a 30% chance of winning $1
million in litigation would only engage in that litigation if the cost was less than the
expected value of that judgment, or $300,000. The foundational principle of
rationality tells us that not all lawsuits with any chance of success will be litigated.
If the chance of success is too remote, or the cost of litigating too high, the
suit is not cost-justified and will not be pursued. This is the scenario Judge Posner
had predicted in Grip-Pak.140 In instances like this, where the expected value of
success on the merits is outweighed by the costs of litigation, no rational litigant
would institute the action. These suits are irrational, despite their merit. This is
reflected in the second equation below.
(2)

xJ < C

Irrational Suit

This inequality represents an instance where an otherwise meritorious lawsuit
is not cost-justified, as the expected value of judgment is less than the cost.
According to Judge Posner and economic theory, this lawsuit would never be
litigated.141 Recall our earlier example, where the expected judgment was $300,000.
Now imagine the costs of litigating were increased to half a million dollars. Filing
this lawsuit would no longer be economically rational.
By breaking down the expected value into its two components, it is clear that
the suit could be cost-justified because the value of winning on the merits is $1
million, which is clearly above the costs of litigating. It is not worth that value,
however, because it is discounted by the odds of success, 30%. Consider alternative
sets of variables that could result in a different expected value, holding the litigation
costs steady at half a million. For instance, a suit with a 75% chance of success, but
only a judgment worth $550,000 would not be rational. Similarly, a suit with a 1%
chance of success would only be rational if the judgment was over $50 million.

139. Myers, supra note 24, at 602.
140. Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 ( 7th Cir. 1982 ) ( “Many
claims not wholly groundless would never be sued on for their own sake; the stakes, discounted
by the probability of winning, would be too low to repay the investment in litigation. Suppose a
monopolist brought a tort action against its single, tiny competitor; the action had a colorable basis in
law; but in fact the monopolist would never have brought the suit—its chances of winning, or the
damages it could hope to get if it did win, were too small compared to what it would have to spend on
the litigation . . . . ” ).
141. See generally id.
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What about a case with no chance of success on the merits? This is Justice
Thomas’s PRE sham concept. If a suit has no chance of success, x would equal
zero and, according to rational-choice theory, it could never be rational.142 This
concept will be discussed further in Part III.
Rational firms will not pursue a lawsuit if it is not cost-justified, no matter
how meritorious. So, when a seemingly irrational lawsuit is filed, courts should be
wary that it is potentially predatory.
In order to determine whether a Legitimate suit is predatory, courts should
examine whether it is Fraudulent or Strategic. This brings us to the third inequality
which shows the first, and most obvious, type of predatory litigation.
(3)

(x+f)J > C

Fraudulent Suit

Here, the introduction of a modifying variable “f” changes the probability of
success on the merits. This inequality is otherwise identical to equation (1). This “f ”
represents any fraudulent attempt by the plaintiff to improperly increase its odds of
success in court, whether by deception, deceit, or other means.
Building off of the example discussed above, if a $1 million lawsuit only had a
30% chance of success and the costs were $500,000, the suit would not be rational.
But, if the plaintiff was willing to defraud the court and manufacture evidence
sufficient to raise its chances of winning to 75%, it could make the expected value
of the suit $750,000. Now, the suit is rational—though wholly illegal. Note that this
equation also assumes that but for the fraudulent increase in probability, the suit
would not be cost-justified.
No one disputes that Fraudulent cases are undeserving of petitioning
immunity. Not only that, but sanctions and other penalties should be enforced
against such cases. As such, this Article does not focus on Fraudulent suits.
The other type of predatory litigation is the Strategic suit. Judge Posner
theorized that, while some suits would seem irrational because they are “too small
compared to what it would have to spend on the litigation,” they could, in fact,
become cost-justified if the monopolist also sought a predatory goal.143 Judge
Posner wrote that, in this situation, the “plaintiff wants to hurt a competitor not by
getting a judgment against him, which would be a proper objective, but just by the
maintenance of the suit, regardless of its outcome.”144 This extrinsic competitive
harm is the hallmark of Strategic litigation. I refer to that harm as the collateral
anticompetitive benefit.

142. Klein, supra note 9, at 20 ( “In the notation here, ‘baseless’ cases are cases with B = 0, while
the economic definition includes all cases for which B < L.” ); id. at 42 (“They involve claims that are
‘baseless,’ ‘frivolous’ or otherwise not colorable” and chance of success equals zero. ).
143. Grip-Pak, 694 F.2d at 472.
144. Id.
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The collateral anticompetitive benefit can be seen in the fourth equation. This
is a modification of inequality (1) and represents Strategic litigation by introducing
the collateral anticompetitive benefit as “A.” Like Judge Posner, this equation
assumes that the suit on its own is not cost-justified. By adding a collateral
anticompetitive benefit, an irrational suit can become rational.
(4)

xJ + A > C

Strategic Suit

The most important feature of this equation is that “A” is not affected by the
probability of success, “x,” unlike the fraudulent “f” variable in equation (3). Here,
“A” is an independent—and therefore guaranteed—value conferred to the plaintiff
merely for initiating the suit. Judge Posner explains this as “hurt[ing] a competitor
not by getting a judgment against him . . . but just by the maintenance of the suit.”145
In our example of the irrational $1 million suit with a 30% chance of success
and costs of $500,000, the introduction of a collateral anticompetitive benefit of at
least $200,000 would make this suit rational. If, for example, instituting a lawsuit
deterred the defendant-competitor’s entry, the plaintiff-monopolist would extract
monopoly profits for a longer period of time, regardless of whether the suit is
ultimately meritorious or not.
Interestingly, a Strategic suit could be predatory whether or not it was a
“sham” as defined by Justice Thomas in PRE, even if x was set to zero. Whether x
is zero, one, or any other value, it is possible that the suit was nonetheless Strategic,
if the value of A was greater than C.
If a lawsuit’s expected value is less than its cost (xJ < C) but the collateral
anticompetitive benefit (A) is large enough to make the suit economically viable,
the suit should be considered predatory. As I noted in Part I, however, courts
routinely immunize Strategic lawsuits, even when their predatory nature is obvious,
because of the PRE test. As long as “x” is greater than zero, the suit could be
considered to have “probable cause” which is enough for antitrust petitioning immunity.
C. Economics Is Not Enough
In conclusion, Strategic, mixed-motive litigation exists and is predatory under
both economic theory and traditional antitrust doctrine. While it is easy to create an
economic model to describe anticompetitive litigation, it is not enough to prosecute
it. This model and theory cannot answer the questions of whether every instance of
Strategic litigation is actionable or how to draw the line between permissible and
impermissible cases.
This problem stems from Strategic litigation’s inherent mixed motives to sue
a competitor and to obtain a collateral anticompetitive benefit. Suing a competitor
is a constitutionally protected action. Imposing a competitive harm on one’s

145.

Id.
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competitor, however, is illegal and goes directly against society’s deeply rooted
beliefs in a fair and free market. When does one goal supersede the other, and how
should courts decide?
In Part III of this Article, I return to the jurisprudence of antitrust petitioning
immunity and bridge the gap between the current legal process of identifying
anticompetitive suits and the economic theory presented above. Specifically,
this Article’s focus is on mixed-motive Strategic suits, such as AbbVie, that have
been hamstrung by the PRE probable-cause prerequisite. I analyze how the
probable-cause barrier is preventing courts from analyzing Strategic litigation like
economists, and I deconstruct these barriers so that, in Part IV, a revised solution
can be constructed.
III. BRIDGING THE DOCTRINAL/ECONOMIC GAP
Economists know that Strategic suits are not the same as shams.146 Strategic
litigation, from an economic perspective, exists when a litigant sues a competitor
with mixed motives. These motives are (1) to seek success on the merits and (2) to
collect a collateral anticompetitive benefit. Of course, the most important question
is how to decide which motive is the stronger motivating force when both motives
are present. For now, the most important fact is just that both motives
simultaneously exist.
Compare a sham suit as defined by PRE with a Strategic suit. In a true sham,
there should be no motive for success on the merits because the case, by definition,
is objectively baseless and lacks probable cause. Without a motive to win on the
merits of the lawsuit, the only motives left are anticompetitive.
The issue with PRE is that some suits with probable cause can still be
Strategic, and therefore predatory. If the lawsuit’s expected value is less than its
cost (xJ < C) but has a collateral anticompetitive benefit (A) large enough to
make the suit economically viable, the suit will pass the PRE test despite being
objectively anticompetitive.
Most courts cannot appreciate this distinction because PRE’s probable-cause
prerequisite prevents them from wrestling with these issues. This prerequisite not
only is irrelevant according to the economic framework of Part II but actually
hinders the ability to analyze the nuanced issues of mixed motives. Thankfully, it is
not necessary and is, in fact, severable from the doctrine of antitrust petitioning
immunity. The next Section of this Article explains why.
A. Deconstructing the Probable-Cause “Requirement”
The PRE decision to grant antitrust petitioning immunity on any case with
probable cause is the largest imposition courts currently face when deciding whether
146. See Klein, supra note 33, at 29 (“The case law frequently defines sham litigation as
anticompetitive litigation that is either ‘baseless’ or fraudulent, whereas economic analysis emphasizes
the anticompetitive goals that motivate the use of government processes to attack rivals.” ).
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a lawsuit should be prosecuted under the antitrust laws. Justice Stevens rightly
criticized this part of Justice Thomas’s decision, saying that “objectively reasonable
lawsuits may still break the law.”147 This proposition is correct. As such, now I will
show why Justice Thomas’s imposition of probable cause is not economically
logical, constitutionally mandated, or doctrinally necessary.
1. Not Economically Logical
The decision by Justice Thomas to use probable cause as a basis for antitrust
petitioning immunity is not economically necessary for analyzing predatory
litigation. To the contrary, such a requirement actually detracts from the relevant
factors and limits courts’ abilities to prosecute anticompetitive cases.
Justice Thomas declared that “[t]he existence of probable cause to institute
legal proceedings precludes a finding that an antitrust defendant has engaged in
sham litigation.”148 He used the traditional definition of probable cause: “no more
than a ‘reasonabl[e] belie[f] that there is a chance that [a] claim may be held valid
upon adjudication.’”149 Justice Thomas chose to equate his conceptualization of
probable cause and objective baselessness with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.150
From an economic perspective, defining a case as objectively baseless or
without probable cause is a method of explaining a case’s chance of success on the
merits. An objectively baseless case has no chance of success, whereas a case with
some merit—probable cause—has some chance of success on the merits.151 Whereas
it is legally impossible for an objectively baseless case to succeed, a case filed with
probable cause has a chance.
Recalling the equations from Part II, economists represent the probable cause
requirement, and therefore objectively baseless suits as defined by PRE, by setting
“x” equal to zero. This is reflected in equation (5) below.
(5)

J(0) < C

PRE “Sham” Suit

In this equation, the lack of probable cause creates a situation where no
meritorious suit is economically rational. Regardless of the amount of the judgment
( J), the suit is not cost-justified because there is no chance of success on the merits.
The case represented in equation (5) is how the PRE test views an objectively

147. PRE, 508 U.S. 49, 75 (1993 ).
148. Id. at 62.
149. Id. at 62–63 ( citing RESTATEMENT ( SECOND ) OF TORTS § 675 cmt. e ( AM. L. INST. 1977 ) ).
150. Id. at 65 ( citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11 ) ( “Columbia’s copyright action was arguably ‘warranted
by existing law’ or at the very least was based on an objectively ‘good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.’” ).
151. Klein, supra note 9, at 42 ( discussing how “claims that are ‘baseless,’ ‘frivolous,’ or
otherwise not colorable” are mathematically represented with a benefit from litigation of zero ).
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baseless “sham.” Economists consider this standard to be “an unduly restrictive
standard that would allow much anticompetitive litigation.”152
Recall our example from Part II, where litigation was not cost-justified
because the odds of success were too slim to make the expected value greater than
the costs.153 This suit is not a sham under PRE, but once the collateral
anticompetitive benefit was introduced, the case became predatory. The only way
such a case would be prosecuted under existing law is if the suit has no chance of
winning (probability equals zero). For courts, the probability of success is
determinative, whereas economists focus instead on the entire equation. This is the
divergence between courts and economists.154
It is enough to say, here, that if a case has probable cause, such that x > 0,
courts following PRE will refuse to analyze whether any collateral anticompetitive
benefit exists. This is to say, in the language of our equations, that if x > 0, the “A ”
variable is disregarded. But as this Section highlights, the probable-cause
requirement is logically unnecessary.155 Why, then, does it exist? The typical
response is that the probable-cause test exists out of deference to the First
Amendment and the history of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
2. Not Constitutionally Mandated
Opinions about antitrust petitioning immunity are riddled with invocations of
the First Amendment. In AbbVie, for example, the court began its analysis of the
sham doctrine with the proclamation that “[t]he defendant’s First Amendment right
‘to petition the Government for a redress of grievances’ is at stake.”156 Since as early
as Noerr, the Supreme Court has viewed the doctrine of antitrust petitioning
immunity as closely related to constitutional issues.157
It is unclear whether Noerr is actually a First Amendment doctrine case or
whether it is an interpretation of the Sherman Act that acutely accounts for the First

152. Id. at 39.
153. Supra notes 140–142 and accompanying text ( In our example of the irrational $1 million
suit with a 30% chance of success and costs of $500,000, the introduction of a collateral anticompetitive
benefit of at least $200,000 would make this suit rational. If, for example, instituting a lawsuit deterred
the defendant-competitor’s entry, the plaintiff-monopolist would extract monopoly profits for a longer
period of time, regardless of whether the suit is ultimately meritorious or not. ).
154. Klein, supra note 9, at 42 ( explaining how “the major disagreement arises over cases in
which the plaintiffs have some chance of winning, but . . . [ the ] collateral benefits from bringing the
suit ( regardless of outcome )” are either insignificant alone to motivate the litigation or where “the
collateral gains alone could prompt the suit, while the benefits on the merits are positive but less than
litigation costs” ).
155. Lao, supra note 14.
156. FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 361 (3d Cir. 2020 ) ( quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I ).
157. E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136–38 ( 1961 )
( warning that imposing an overly aggressive interpretation of the Sherman Act “would raise important
constitutional questions” ).
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Amendment.158 Courts also wrestle with this question.159 Whether it is directly
derivative of the First Amendment or not, I argue that, as long as Noerr immunity
does not extend beyond existing First Amendment principles, there can be no
argument that the doctrine conflicts with the right to petition such that it could be
deemed unconstitutional.
The First Amendment does not protect every lawsuit filed with probable
cause. Many have relied on the First Amendment, and a fear of “chilling” the right
to petition, as a defense to expanding the scope of antitrust petitioning immunity
for litigation.160 However, in reality, antitrust litigants are offered a uniquely high
level of First Amendment protection under Justice Thomas’s PRE test.
The existence and prosecution of abuse-of-process claims show that the
requirement for probable cause cannot be the constitutional line protecting the
right to petition. The Court in California Motor, which relied heavily on the
First Amendment, did not fear imposing antitrust liability on cases filed with
probable cause. In fact, “California Motor identified the First Amendment as the
principal source of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, . . . extended it still further to the
conduct of litigation,” and expressly used it to impose liability on cases filed with
probable cause.161
The suits filed in California Motor were not objectively baseless or irrational.
In fact, the defendants had won over half of their forty cases, leading one
scholar to joke that “not only did their litigations have a genuine chance of

158. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 121, at 1200 ( “Significantly, California Motor Transport also
expressly held that Noerr-Pennington is based both on an interpretation of the Sherman Act and on
the Petition Clause of the First Amendment.” ); David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust
Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
293, 300 ( 1994 ) (“The Court is clear that it does not want to encroach on the First Amendment rights
identified in Noerr . . . . But the Court has not used First Amendment principles in defining the scope
of the doctrine.” ); Roche, supra note 28; Calkins, supra note 26, at 346 n.96 ( “As some have expressed
it, Noerr is a statutory doctrine with a constitutional ‘core.’” ); David L. Meyer, A Standard for Tailoring
Noerr-Pennington Immunity More Closely to the First Amendment Mandate, 95 YALE L.J. 832, 832
( 1986 ) ( “The Supreme Court has repeatedly held this basic policy to be of near-constitutional
importance.” ( emphasis added ) ( first citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610
( 1972 ); and then citing Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 ( 1933 ) ) ).
159. See, e.g., Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 931 n.5 ( 9th Cir. 2006 ) (“Noerr-Pennington
is a specific application of the rule of statutory construction known as the canon of constitutional
avoidance, which requires a statute to be construed so as to avoid serious doubts as to the
constitutionality of an alternate construction.” ).
160. FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 361 (3d Cir. 2020 ) ( quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I ),
cert. denied.
161. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 371
( 7th Cir. 1987 ) ( first citing Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government
Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80, 94–104 ( 1977 );
and then citing James D. Hurwitz & Debra Simmons Neveu, The Noerr Doctrine: Its Significance and
Current Interpretation, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN THE
REGULATORY PROCESS 33, 47–50 (F.T.C. 1984 ) ).
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success . . . they were batting over .500!”162 Legal merit did not cloak these litigants
in constitutional immunity.
In California Motor, the Supreme Court based its decision to not immunize the
anticompetitive suits on the principle that First Amendment rights cannot be
immunized from scrutiny when they are used as the means to violate a statute.163
It said that while litigants “have the right of access to the . . . courts to be
heard . . . that does not necessarily give them immunity from the antitrust laws.”164
The Court went on to say that “it is well settled that First Amendment rights are
not immunized from regulation when they are used as an integral part of conduct
which violates a valid statute.”165 The Court concluded that “[i]f the end result is
unlawful, it matters not that the means used in violation may be lawful.”166
Years later, Judge Posner interpreted California Motor’s analysis to support the
theory that probable cause was not a constitutionally mandated baseline for
immunizing litigation from scrutiny.167 In Grip-Pak, Judge Posner preemptively
resolved the issue of whether probable cause was a constitutional requirement and
stated that
If all nonmalicious litigation were immunized from government regulation
by the First Amendment, the tort of abuse of process would be
unconstitutional—something that, so far as we know, no one believes. The
difference between abuse of process and malicious prosecution is that the former does
not require proving that the lawsuit was brought without probable cause . . . . If
abuse of process is not constitutionally protected, no more should
litigation that has an improper anticompetitive purpose be protected, even
though the plaintiff has a colorable claim.168
This position has been echoed by scholars as well.169 In short, there is no
constitutional demand for blanketly immunizing all suits with probable cause. As
162. Elhauge, supra note 25, at 1190.
163. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 514 (1972 ).
164. Id. at 513–14.
165. Id. at 514 ( citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 ( 1949 ) ) (“[ I]t
has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct
illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language,
either spoken, written, or printed . . . . Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties
of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in
restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.” ).
166. Id. at 515.
167. Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 471 (7th Cir. 1982 ) (“It takes a rather
free-wheeling imagination to extrapolate from the California Motor Transport opinion a principle that
if applied across the board would, as we have suggested, make the tort of abuse of process invalid
under the First Amendment; and we decline to do so—noting, also, that the Court used the language
of abuse of process to describe the kind of litigation activity that the First Amendment does not
protect.”( comparing Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 513, with Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc.,
516 F.2d 220, 228 ( 7th Cir. 1975 ) ) ).
168. Id. ( emphasis added ).
169. See Lao, supra note 14, at 1012 ( “[ T]he First Amendment right of petition does not require
the constitutional protection of all lawsuits except those lacking probable cause . . . . If abuse of process
is actionable even for underlying suits that had probable cause, and no one has ever suggested that the
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such, any decision to use probable cause as a gatekeeper to protect anticompetitive
litigation from scrutiny must be part of “a separate question whether, as a matter
of antitrust principle, the Sherman Act should be interpreted to forbid using
litigation to suppress competition.”170 As the next Subsection explains, this is not
correct either.
3. Not Doctrinally Necessary
Justice Thomas made the intentional choice in PRE to declare probable cause
a requirement for antitrust petitioning immunity. He correctly surmised that, from
the beginning of the doctrine, antitrust petitioning immunity demanded an
“unprotected activity lack objective reasonableness.”171 His misstep, however, was
holding that the objective inquiry was into the legal reasonableness of the case.
In California Motor, the conduct that did not deserve antitrust immunity
was described as a series of “‘proceedings and actions . . . with or without probable
cause, and regardless of the merits of the cases.’”172 Probable cause was not the deciding
factor, but Justice Thomas ignored this distinction. In fact, both Justice Thomas
and the Ninth Circuit cited this exact phrase from California Motor but withheld
critical information.
In Justice Thomas’s recitation of the Ninth Circuit’s summary judgment
decision, he quoted the lower court’s explanation of sham litigation as either an
abuse of the judicial process, a misrepresentation in the adjudicatory process, or the
pursuit of a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims instituted “without probable cause,
and regardless of the merits.”173 The Ninth Circuit’s omission of the words “with or”
is material.
The Court in California Motor expressly held that cases brought with probable
cause could be shams, but the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation ignored that distinction.
The Ninth Circuit went so far as to state that “the existence of probable cause
‘preclude[d] the application of the sham exception as a matter of law’ because ‘a
suit brought with probable cause does not fall within the sham exception to the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine.’”174 The Ninth Circuit concluded that it saw “no basis for
holding that a suit brought with probable cause in fact and law may be a sham”
and said that such a holding would “erode the first amendment right to petition
that is the basis for the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.”175 Justice Thomas then repeated
this logic.

tort is unconstitutional, it necessarily follows that the right of petition does not constitutionally mandate
protection of all litigation except those without probable cause.” ).
170. Grip-Pak, 694 F.2d at 471–72.
171. PRE, 508 U.S. 49, 57 (1993 ).
172. Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 512 ( emphasis added ).
173. PRE, 508 U.S. at 54 ( emphasis added ) ( quoting Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1530 ( 9th Cir. 1991 ) ( quoting Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 513 ) ).
174. Id. (quoting PRE, 944 F.2d at 1531–32 ).
175. PRE, 944 F.2d at 1531.
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Justice Thomas interpreted California Motor as signifying that “the institution
of legal proceedings ‘without probable cause’ will give rise to a sham if such activity
effectively ‘bar[s] . . . competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals
and so . . . usurp[s] th[e] decision-making process.’”176 This interpretation, coupled
with his conclusion that California Motor required an “indispensable objective
component,” resulted in the probable-cause requirement.177 Justice Thomas
believed that the legal objectivity of a case was the objective component, whereas a
reading of the plain language of California Motor clearly shows that its holding was
not based on legal merit.
The Court in California Motor looked for a set of facts that would lead “the
factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have been
abused.”178 The Court admitted that it would “be a difficult line to discern and
draw” but that once it was drawn—and it could be shown “that abuse of those
processes produced an illegal result”—a sham would be identified.179 This was its
objective inquiry—not legal merit.
The question still remains: how and why did Justice Thomas agree with the
Ninth Circuit to adopt its standard instead of using this opportunity to advance the
doctrine? At least two answers exist. First, as mentioned in Part I, the facts of PRE
were not conducive to creating a robust predatory-litigation test. Justice Stevens
pointed out in his concurrence that the case was “easy” and under any version of
the existing sham tests, PRE would never be considered a sham.180 There were no
allegations of fraud or a collateral anticompetitive benefit. It is debatable whether,
under the economic framework, the case is predatory at all. As such, Justice Thomas
would have had to use hypothetical anticompetitive injuries, instead of PRE’s facts,
to construct a robust predatory-litigation test.
The second possible reason that Justice Thomas was so easily swayed by the
Ninth Circuit was that PRE committed a tactical error during the litigation. In its
brief to the Supreme Court, PRE argued for a sham standard whereby the court had
to subjectively determine whether the allegedly predatory plaintiff was indifferent
to the outcome of the litigation.181 No justice was interested in relying on subjective
evidence of the motivations of the case.182 So, at oral argument, PRE chose a new
theory. During questioning, petitioner’s counsel was asked about its theory of
genuine motivation and compared it to an ulterior motive.183 He responded that,
upon reflection after filing the brief, “a more workable standard for the Court

176. PRE, 508 U.S. at 58 ( quoting Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 512 ) ( emphasis added ).
177. Id.
178. Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 513.
179. Id.
180. See PRE, 508 U.S. at 76 ( Stevens, J., concurring ).
181. Id. at 56 ( majority opinion ).
182. See id. at 76 ( Stevens, J., concurring ).
183. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., 508 U.S. 49 ( 1993 ) ( No. 91-1043 ), 1992 WL 687879, at *10.
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[would be] to examine [shams] on a but-for basis.”184 This standard, almost identical
to that of Grip-Pak, was dismissed by Justice Thomas off-hand in the opinion but
cited extensively by Justice Stevens.185 Had the issue been briefed properly, or had
the facts been conducive to such a theory, would the outcome have been different?
In conclusion, the probable-cause standard is not economically necessary to
identifying predatory litigation and actually inhibits a court’s ability to identify
Strategic lawsuits. It is not constitutionally mandated, as the continued existence of
the tort of abuse of process shows. And it was not doctrinally predetermined. PRE
was a poor test case for determining the legal contours of predatory litigation.
While the probable-cause requirement is economically, constitutionally, and
doctrinally unnecessary, it serves as a serviceable test for “baseless” lawsuits that
seek to harm competition. It creates a test for one form of a predatory lawsuit, but
not for all of them. So, as courts have done ever since PRE was decided, they can
distinguish their cases based on the facts. Under my proposal, PRE is limited to the
analysis of the types of cases identified in equation (5), supra. For other types of
predatory suits, however, probable cause cannot be a restriction.
*****
Having deconstructed the probable-cause requirement and shown why a
revision of the predatory-litigation law can survive without it, we may now analyze
the second distinction between the law and economics of antitrust petitioning
immunity. This issue is intent.
PRE “reject[ed] a purely subjective definition of ‘sham.’”186 In fact, both
Justices Thomas and Stevens support the proposition that evidence of predatory
litigation should be objective, not subjective.187 As a result, Justice Thomas relegated
any analysis of subjective intent to the second step of the PRE sham standard.188
Courts still use subjective evidence of predatory intent to decide whether a case fits
the PRE definition of sham.189 As I describe next, use of subjective evidence is not
184. Id. ( Petitioner: “On reflecting further on it, what may be a more workable standard for the
Court is to examine it on a but-for basis; namely, if the case would not have been brought but for the
predatory motive separating out the legitimate petitioning motive from the predatory motive, if it were
not brought but for the predatory motive, that case would never have been brought at all legitimately.” ).
185. PRE, 508 U.S. at 56.
186. Id. at 60.
187. Compare id. at 57 ( “We left unresolved the question presented by this case—whether
litigation may be sham merely because a subjective expectation of success does not motivate the litigant.
We now answer this question in the negative and hold that an objectively reasonable effort to litigate
cannot be sham regardless of subjective intent.” ), with id. at 75–76 ( Stevens, J., concurring ) ( “In sum,
in this case I agree with the Court’s explanation of why respondents’ copyright infringement action was
not ‘objectively baseless,’ and why allegations of improper subjective motivation do not make such a
lawsuit a ‘sham.’” ).
188. Id. at 60 ( “Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the
litigant’s subjective motivation.” ).
189. See, e.g., FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 370 (3d Cir. 2020 ), ( citations omitted)
( “[ C]onsider the following syllogism: ( 1 ) A lawsuit is objectively baseless if ‘no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits[ ;]’ (2 ) and a litigant who files an objectively baseless lawsuit
must have had some subjective motivation for suing; ( 3 ) but because the lawsuit was objectively
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the economically sound way to identify predatory litigation, as some courts have
already suggested.190 Instead, courts should use objective evidence under the theory
of specific intent.
B. Addressing Anticompetitive Intent
Obtaining evidence of anticompetitive intent is one of the hardest issues facing
courts surrounding antitrust petitioning immunity.191 The difficulty lies in the
“evidentiary problems of disentangling real from professed motives.”192 This fear is
what has driven the doctrine towards proxies like probable cause or the number of
suits filed.193 Such proxies avoid the two important questions: first, what kind of
evidence should be used to support a claim of anticompetitive intent, and second,
what intent is actually the predatory one?
1. Specific Versus Subjective Intent
It is possible to use objective evidence to establish predatory intent. Judge
Posner did not believe that “the difficulty of distinguishing lawful from unlawful
purpose in litigation between competitors is so acute that such litigation can never
be considered an actionable restraint of trade, provided it has some, though perhaps
only threadbare, basis in law.”194 Most importantly, he declared that “[t]he difficulty
of determining the true purpose [of a lawsuit] is great but no more so than in many
other areas of antitrust law.”195 Existing antitrust doctrine provides the solution.

baseless, the litigant’s subjective motivation could not have been success on the merits, unless the
litigant was unreasonable; ( 4 ) thus, a reasonable litigant’s subjective motivation for filing an objectively
baseless lawsuit must be something besides success on the merits.” ), cert. denied.
190. See id. at 361 (“[ T ]he number of lawsuits a brand-name drug manufacturer files will
sometimes reveal little about its subjective motivation for suing, because the Hatch-Waxman Act
‘incentivizes [ brands ] to promptly file patent infringement suits by rewarding them with a stay of up
to 30 months if they do so.’” ( quoting In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig. Indirect Purchaser Class, 868
F.3d 132, 132 (3d Cir. 2016 ) ) ).
191. See, e.g., Hurwitz, supra note 3, at 98 (“Courts and commentators generally agree that proof
of improper intent, as described in MCI, is required to overcome the presumption of good faith
petitioning and demonstrate a sham. Nonetheless, there is no consensus on how antitrust plaintiffs
may, or must, demonstrate that intent.” ).
192. See Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 ( 7th Cir. 1982 ).
193. Id. ( citing Fischel, supra note 161, at 109–10) ( “Concern with the evidentiary
problems may explain why some courts hold that a single lawsuit cannot provide a basis for an
antitrust claim . . . . ” ).
194. Id. Judge Posner’s logic was that the difficulty inherent in determining a litigant’s true
intent for filing a lawsuit was not worth diluting the doctrine. He was “not prepared to rule that the
difficulty of distinguishing lawful from unlawful purpose in litigation between competitors is so acute
that such litigation can never be considered an actionable restraint of trade, provided it has some,
though perhaps only threadbare, basis in law.” Id. He explained the problem as being “harder than
distinguishing lawful from unlawful purpose in abuse of process cases, though even there subtle
distinctions abound—for example, the distinction between suing to get damages and suing to induce
the defendant to discontinue the activity challenged in the suit by putting him to the expense of
litigation.” Id.
195. Id.
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Instead of combing through records to find evidence of the individual
actors’ actual anticompetitive intent, antitrust cases often rely on evidence of
“specific intent to monopolize, in the sense that the overwhelming—perhaps the
sole—purpose of the defendant’s conduct is to reduce competition.”196 To be
found with a specific anticompetitive intent, the defendant would need to have
“intended to harm competition.”197
Specific intent is not synonymous with subjective intent.198 Subjective intent
requires a production of “evidence that directly reveals the particular defendant’s
state of mind.”199 In contrast, specific-intent analysis is “conducted on the basis of
objective evidence, respecting the necessary consequences of actions. Rather than
asking for direct evidence of what the defendant had in mind, the objective
approach asks what can be inferred as a state of mind reasonably attributable to
defendant in light of his conduct.”200 Antitrust jurists believe that this is true because
of the foundational principle of rationality.201 Intent can, therefore, be inferred from
a monopolist’s actions.
Specific intent is especially favored in Sherman Act section 2 predation
cases.202 This approach allows courts to infer intent “on the basis of the evidence
indicating the absence of credible [procompetitive] . . . justifications for the
monopolist’s conduct.”203 The Supreme Court chose to adhere to specific intent in
Aspen Skiing, for example, because Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, believed
that “‘no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing’”204 and that
anticompetitive exclusion is “‘always deliberately intended.’”205
Consider how, using a specific-intent standard, a predator-plaintiff’s intent
could be expressed objectively as the expected value of the suit and the guaranteed
value of the collateral anticompetitive benefit. This would provide evidence of
whether the suit was motivated by a predatory purpose without relying on subjective

196. Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent 3 ( Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law
Working Paper Series, Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 00-02, 2000 ), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=239324 [ https://perma.cc/XK95-R32P] ( citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416, 432 ( 2d Cir. 1945 ) ).
197. Id. at 7.
198. See Hurwitz, supra note 3, at 99 (“Subjective intent standards also raise concerns. As
Professor Areeda has observed, the problems of proof are substantial. These difficulties are
compounded where a party acts from several motives or where a corporate decision to litigate reflects
the views of committee members who have differing perspectives, opinions, and goals. In addition,
litigation is not often amenable to ex post strategic or cost-benefit analyses to disclose the suit’s
generating influences.” ).
199. Cass & Hylton, supra note 196, at 4.
200. Id.
201. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1984 ) ( quoting
Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 432 ).
202. Id.
203. Cass & Hylton, supra note 196, at 22.
204. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 602 (quoting Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 432 ).
205. Id. (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 160 (1st ed. 1978 ) ).

Second to printer_Hakun.docx (Do Not Delete)

2022 ]

8/23/2022 3:16 PM

STRATEGIC LITIGATION

899

evidence of intent, which is “too easy to hide—and allege.”206 For this reason, and
others, the use of specific-intent evidence is preferred to subjective-intent evidence.207
Having identified an objective source of evidence to build a case of predatory
intent, it is time to identify and distinguish the multiple anticompetitive intents at
issue in claims of predatory litigation. Two anticompetitive intents are at issue, but
only one is predatory.
2. Distinguishing Acceptably Anticompetitive and Predatory Intents
In predatory litigation, multiple intents are at play.208 First, there is the
obvious: when a plaintiff-competitor files a lawsuit against a competitor, it (should)
hope to win the suit in court.209 I will refer to this as the “outcome” intent.
All outcome intents are immunized under Noerr-Pennington. That is why the
doctrine exists. No matter what the plaintiff hopes to accomplish through its verdict
from the courts, Noerr-Pennington protects the result. A litigant suing a competitor
to win and maintain a monopoly, or obtain one through defeating a foe in court,
has an inherent anticompetitive motivation. This is an anticompetitive “outcome”
intent, and no matter how strong, vicious, or malicious the intent, it is immunized.
This point is echoed by Judge Posner in Grip-Pak: “[L]itigation is [not] actionable
under the antitrust laws merely because the plaintiff is trying to get a monopoly. He
is entitled to pursue such a goal through lawful means, including litigation against
competitors.”210 This is not the only intent to monopolize that is present, however.
There is a second anticompetitive intent that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
should not immunize: the intent to harm the competitor through invoking the
litigation process. While pursuing a monopoly is permissible, “[t]he line is crossed
when his purpose is not to win a favorable judgment against a competitor but to
harass him, and deter others, by the process itself—regardless of outcome—of
litigating.”211 This anticompetitive externality is the “abuse of process” intent.

206. Elhauge, supra note 25, at 1232; see also Cass & Hylton, supra note 196, at 21 ( “Where there
is a real intent to do something illegal, well-advised firms are unlikely to provide much in the way of
helpful evidence . . . . If antitrust plaintiffs were required to prove subjective intent through reference
to statements that provided clear intent of it, it would be the extraordinary case where any firm would
retain ‘smoking gun’ memoranda in their files.” ).
207. See Daniel J. Gifford, The Role of the Ninth Circuit in the Development of the Law of
Attempt to Monopolize, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021, 1021–23 (1986) (specific-intent evidence
resolves ambiguities surrounding defendant’s conduct); see also Cass & Hylton, supra note 196, at 22
( noting that the Supreme Court “seems to have read [ section 2 of the Sherman Act ] as imposing a
specific-intent requirement” ).
208. See Elhauge, supra note 25, at 1231 ( “The most strategic of litigants genuinely hope they
win, even if the odds may not look good, and the most nonstrategic of litigants usually dislike their
opponents enough to take some pleasure in inflicting litigation costs on them.” ).
209. This motive, presumably, exists whether or not there is probable cause—because even a
case that some would say lacks probable cause could win, and winning never hurts. Setting aside this
particular idiosyncrasy, the motivation to win is ever present.
210. Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982 ).
211. Id.
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Abuse-of-process intents should not be immunized because they are not
based on the disinterested, neutral decision of a third party like the court.212 When
the intent to injure arises from the “process—as opposed to the outcome,”
Noerr-Pennington should not provide protection.213
In addition to understanding the difference between an anticompetitive intent
based on the competitive harms from the outcome of a suit versus an intent to use
the process to harm competition, it is helpful to distinguish the potential injuries these
intents seek to inflict. Courts, however, routinely ignore this distinction. Whereas
injuries from the court’s decision on the merits are immunized, injuries arising from
the institution of the suit that are not outcome dependent are not immunized.214
Justice Stevens wrote that the “distinction between abusing the judicial process
to restrain competition and prosecuting a lawsuit that, if successful, will restrain
competition must guide any court’s decision whether a particular filing, or series of
filings, is a sham.”215 An injury that arises from the resolution of the lawsuit is
protected under Noerr-Pennington, even if the suit was motivated by anticompetitive
intent. On the other hand, a collateral injury that arises from the mere imposition
or maintenance of the suit may result in an antitrust case.
In Premier Electric, Judge Easterbrook explained that to properly honor
Noerr’s sham exception “it is important to identify the source of the injury to
competition.”216 He eloquently summarized the distinction between outcome and
abuse of process intents as follows:
If the [competitive] injury is caused by persuading the government, then
the antitrust laws do not apply to the . . . [resulting] persuasion . . . . If the
injury flows directly from the “petitioning”—if the injury occurs no matter
how the government responds to the request for aid—then we have an
antitrust case.217
When a competitor files a lawsuit, and that action triggers a simultaneous
injury to a competitor, the court must be able to articulate and separate the injuries.
Use of the judicial process to harass or deter competitors is when immunity should
not apply. This concept, coupled with the differences between process and outcome
intent, provides the necessary framework to understand the necessary goals for
curtailing for predatory litigation.
The guiding definition of a sham is “the use of ‘the governmental process—as
opposed to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon.’”218 While
many courts have quoted this phrase in their opinions, it is almost never used as it

212. See generally Elhauge, supra note 25.
213. Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 ( 1991 ).
214. Elhauge, supra note 25, at 1228 (“The answer is that the injury results no matter what the
government official decides.” ).
215. PRE, 508 U.S. 49, 68 (1993 ) ( Stevens, J., concurring ) ( emphasis added ).
216. Premier Elec. Const. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 376 (7th Cir. 1987 ).
217. Id.
218. PRE, 508 U.S. at 68 ( Stevens, J., concurring ) ( quoting Omni, 499 U.S. at 380 ).
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should be: to guide the analysis. As such, in Part IV, I use this principle along with
the theory of specific intent to derive a practical and appropriate standard for
prosecuting predatory litigation.
IV. PROPOSAL: PROSECUTING PREDATORY, MIXED-MOTIVE SUITS
This Article was inspired by a desire to correct the mistakes Justice Stevens
identified in PRE. He saw PRE as an “easy case” that was being used “as a vehicle
for announcing a rule that may govern the decision of difficult cases, some of which
may involve abuse of the judicial process.”219 Now, having explored some difficult
cases improperly immunized by PRE’s probable-cause prerequisite, exposed the
underlying logical missteps of its analysis, and spent considerable time properly
laying the economic foundations and appropriate evidentiary analysis of predatory
litigation, we may now move forward. I have established that an abuse-of-process
theory of prosecuting predatory suits is constitutionally permissible, economically
logical, and not doctrinally foreclosed, but this does not settle the practical question
of how courts should evaluate such mixed-motive cases.
The First Amendment protects litigants seeking redress from the judiciary,
and Noerr-Pennington bestows petitioning immunity to them even if the results
they seek are anticompetitively motivated. This second, distinct, and improper
anticompetitive goal can simultaneously exist within that same conduct. When
a plaintiff’s engagement of the legal process strategically imposes collateral
anticompetitive harm on a competitor that benefits the plaintiff regardless of the
outcome of the suit, how should courts address that externality?
Below, Table 1 outlines the differences between the PRE test (top-left half of
boxes) with the economics of predatory litigation (lower-right half). See how these
differing tests only lead to one situation where the outcome is different.

219.

Id. at 76.
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No

PRE immunity

PRE immunity

Not Predatory

Yes

Collateral Anticompetitive Benefit

Legal Basis: Probable Cause
No
Yes

PRE “sham”

Definitely Predatory

Not Predatory

PRE immunity

Possibly Predatory

Table 1: Identifying Predatory Litigation
In the fourth quadrant (lower-right box) lies the world of mixed motives.
These cases, defined as one where “the process of petitioning is used both in hopes
of obtaining governmental action and in order to impose expense and delay on
competitors,” are where the courts and economists diverge.220 Under PRE, mixed
motives do not impact sham analysis. If the suit has any legal merit (i.e., probable
cause) the collateral anticompetitive benefits are ignored out of deference to the
First Amendment. As this Article has shown, this approach is unnecessary,
imprecise, and ignores the fundamental issue.
The solution is not as easy as flipping the script. One cannot expect the mere
existence of a collateral anticompetitive benefit to automatically destroy any chance
of antitrust petitioning immunity, either. As Professor Elhauge explains:
If a genuine hope of winning sufficed to receive immunity, then abuses of
process would effectively go undeterred, and predatory litigation would
flourish. If, on the other hand, a purpose of harassing opponents sufficed
to lose immunity, then firms would fear to bring even meritorious litigation
against their competitors. The mere existence of either motive should thus
not suffice to establish immunity or non-immunity. Some weighing of the
motives must be made.221

220.
221.

Elhauge, supra note 25, at 1192.
Id. at 1231 ( emphasis added ).
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I agree. But before reaching this critical balancing test, I will address several
screening techniques that courts should utilize to decrease the chances of
improperly stripping a litigant of its petitioning immunity when the time to balance
motives arises.
This Article proposes a robust inquiry into whether litigation is used as an
anticompetitive weapon that is mindful of protections for those who petition the
government. The primary tension that my proposal resolves is the minimization of
false positives (genuine lawsuits that are mistakenly prosecuted as predatory) while
not categorically protecting false negatives (predatory suits that receive petitioning
immunity) like the PRE test.
To achieve this goal, I propose a three-step process. First, the case would need
to be evaluated through an “antitrust screen” that would eliminate allegations of
predatory litigation that are not, in fact, antitrust claims. Second, if the case
successfully passed the “antitrust screen,” the case would then have to pass through
the second screen that seeks to eliminate close instances of false positives. Third, if
the case survives the two screens, then the case loses Noerr petitioning immunity
and is analyzed under the typical predation test from antitrust law. Now, I break
down each component of this test.
A. The Antitrust Screen
In Part II, I discussed several market factors that would allow courts to
discern whether a predatory suit was possible from an antitrust standpoint.222
These factors are (1) market power, (2) existence of a competitive or potentially
competitive relationship between plaintiff and defendant, and (3) some collateral
anticompetitive benefit stemming from the litigation. The existence of these
three factors establish that the case is properly filed as an antitrust claim. Most
interestingly, PRE would fail this test because there was no evidence of any
collateral anticompetitive benefit.
B. The Specific-Intent Screen
After determining these market factors exist, it is time to begin critically
analyzing the intents and injuries stemming from the allegedly anticompetitive
litigation. Recall the analysis of the multiple anticompetitive motives and injuries
from Part III of this Article. There, I laid out that a predatory lawsuit could have
two different motives and sources of anticompetitive injury. The difference was
whether the intent to harm competition or the resulting injury arose from the
outcome or the process. First, I will discuss the injury.
If an allegedly predatory lawsuit does not have a collateral anticompetitive
injury, it can never be the subject of a section 2 violation. If the only anticompetitive
injury arising from an allegedly predatory case is from the relief sought by the

222.

See generally supra Part II.
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underlying plaintiff, then this is not an instance of mixed motives and there is no
attempt to inflict injury through the litigation process. Such a case must be immunized
under Noerr-Pennington.
In contrast, if the antitrust plaintiff can articulate a cognizable antitrust injury
stemming from the litigation process, as opposed to the outcome, then a predatory case
can exist. To establish whether a litigant possessed an anticompetitive intent to
inflict that process injury, I recommend using specific-intent analysis, instead of
subjective intent.
Then, the question arises, how much evidence is necessary? Past proposals
have included examinations of whether one motive or the other was “significant”223
and a proposal that the collateral anticompetitive benefit be both a “necessary and
sufficient objective motivation for the allegedly strategic litigation.”224
Of these proposals, the combination of necessary and sufficient conditions
appears not only to be the most robust but also the one that most closely resembles
the underlying antitrust principles in play and the abuse-of-process foundation of
the legal test at issue. This test, proposed by Professor Elhauge, requires “the
antitrust plaintiff alleging strategic litigation” to show “(1) that the antitrust
defendant would not have brought the original suit but for the direct injury imposed
on his competitor, and (2) that the defendant would have brought suit even without
any prospect of winning in order to inflict the direct costs or delays on his
competitor.”225 From an economic equation standpoint, Elhauge’s test would look
like equation 6 below.
(6)

Jx < C < A

Prosecutable Predatory Litigation

The expected judgment of the litigation itself, as opposed to the costs of
litigation, makes the suit irrational. At the same time, the collateral anticompetitive
benefit, itself, is more valuable than the cost of litigating. The predator needed the
collateral anticompetitive benefit to make the suit rational and the value of that
benefit alone was worth initiating the suit.
The sufficient condition, that the collateral anticompetitive benefit to the
predatory litigant exceed the cost of litigating, is out of deference to the abuse of
process “primary” motive doctrine.226 The necessary condition, that the expected
value of the suit be less than the cost of litigating, follows the profit sacrifice model
used in antitrust for predatory action in section 2 cases and Judge Posner’s
Grip-Pak opinion. Under this test, “the monopolist’s conduct must be irrational but

223. See Elhauge, supra note 25, at 1232 ( citing Coastal States Mktg. Inc., v. Hunt, 694 F.2d
1358, 1372 ( 5th Cir. 1983 ) ).
224. Id. at 1234.
225. Id.
226. See generally, RESTATEMENT ( SECOND ) OF TORTS § 682 ( AM. L. INST. 1965 ).
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for its anticompetitive effect.”227 This is precisely what Judge Posner articulated in
Grip-Pak, Justice Stevens suggested in PRE, and economists have concluded is the
proper test for predatory behavior in the antitrust realm, as described in Part III.
But, unlike Professor Elhauge’s proposal, I do not recommend requiring that
both the necessary and sufficient conditions be met to lose Noerr-Pennington
petitioning immunity. This is because, unlike PRE “sham” litigation, Strategic
litigation under this test should not be treated as per se anticompetitive. Strategic
litigation should only become predatory under the antitrust laws after a thorough
analysis of whether the profit sacrifice test was met. Instead, I argue that the
sufficient condition, whether the case would have been filed even with no chance
of success, should be the threshold question that determines whether immunity
should exist. If that can be established, then the necessary condition, the profit
sacrifice test, should be analyzed traditionally.
C. Predatory Behavior, Profit Sacrifice Analysis
To review, to plead a proper case of predatory litigation, the plaintiff must
first pass the “antitrust screen.” This requires establishing “(1) ‘evidence of market
structure’ (i.e., market power and relevant markets . . . ) and (2) ‘exclusionary effect’
(i.e., foreclosure of a competitor from a market . . . )—‘both of which can ordinarily
be obtained without access to the defendant’s own records—[and] indicate that an
antitrust violation is plausible.’”228 These factors, plus evidence that the plaintiff and
defendant are competitors, are the first-level antitrust screens.
Then, to overcome the presumption of antitrust petitioning immunity, the
antitrust plaintiff would have to plausibly allege that “the defendant would have
brought suit even without any prospect of winning in order to inflict the direct
[anticompetitive harm] on his competitor.”229 This is the sufficient condition
proposed by Professor Elhauge.
At this point, the antitrust plaintiff has shown that the monopolist defendant
had market power, that the defendant was a competitor of the plaintiff, that the
litigation process caused the plaintiff anticompetitive harm, and that the benefit to
the monopolist of that harm was large enough to be worth filing this lawsuit, even
if there was no chance of winning. Accordingly, the potentially predatory suit should
not be immunized under Noerr-Pennington and should be evaluated in a manner
similar to other forms of allegedly predatory conduct under section 2.
The goal would be to determine whether the primary motive was to harm
competition through the litigation process, not the outcome. This would be
governed by specific evidence of anticompetitive intent. The prosecuting entity

227. Novell, Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1075 ( 10th Cir. 2013 ) ( citing Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 ( 1984 ) ).
228. Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 462 ( 7th Cir. 2020 ) ( quoting Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 90 ( 2018 ) ).
229. Elhauge, supra note 25, at 1234.
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would present objective evidence that the conduct was irrational but for the
collateral anticompetitive benefit, as well as any subjective evidence of improper
anticompetitive intent that could be useful to assist the finder of fact. Against this,
the accused predator would argue that the anticompetitive impact from the process
was not the driving force of the suit.
Finally, the finder of fact would be tasked with deciding the primary motive
for the suit. Whether this is done via a calculation of expected benefit versus
the collateral anticompetitive benefit or is done qualitatively is not necessary to
define now. The importance of this test is to provide adequate screens to prevent
false positives, while still ensuring that predatory litigation can be identified
and prosecuted.
As with any test, it is imperfect. If a predatory motive existed but was not
sufficiently large enough on its own to justify the suit, an irrational lawsuit would
still be immunized under this test. At the same time, a borderline-Legitimate suit
that was filed alongside a coincidental anticompetitive harm could, theoretically, be
improperly prosecuted. However, the fact that I am using market screens to ensure
that only dominant players pursuing monopolies whose actions have imposed
exclusionary effects on competitors ensures that even if this test is incorrect, it
harms someone who can afford the mistake.
CONCLUSION
When litigation is used as an anticompetitive weapon, it should be prosecuted
under the antitrust laws as predatory. Under our current framework, this is only
sometimes the case. Hopefully, this Article’s proposal provides a solution to this
problem that is accurate, practical, and fair. While no standard is perfect, this Article
may help future courts grapple with the failings of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
when mixed motives are at play. The mixed motives of strategic, predatory litigation
impose great challenges on our courts, but as I have laid out here, this problem is
not only solvable, but very much worth solving.

